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INTRODUCTION

There has been a sudden and dramatic shift in the attitude of many
local and some state governments in the last several years. Promotional
campaigns to attract people and business have given way to studies designed to justify the feelings of local citizens that new development and
growth harm rather than benefit their community. Significant investments of energy and money are being made in programs to direct, control, or block growth.'
We are perhaps too close to the events to fully understand this
phenomenon. No doubt sometimes the well-to-do are just trying to preserve and keep safe their "islands" from the rest of us. The "new mood"
may reflect the need in our fast-paced society to preserve the natural
and cultural characteristics that allow a satisfactory and acceptable way
of life.2 But the dominant reason for this attitudinal turnabout is that
state and local governments, and those who elect them, have come to
believe that growth costs more and creates more problems than it is
worth.' How much of this belief is based on myth and how much on
'The literature concerning growth control or growth management is rapidly expanding.
See, e.g., E. FINKLER & D. PETERSON, NONGROWT PLANNING STRATEGIES, THE DEVELOPING
PowER OF TOWNS, CITIES AND REGIONS (1974); TASK FORCE ON LAND USE AND URBAN

GROWTH, ROCKEFELLER BROS. FUND, THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZENS GUIDE TO URBAN
GnowTm (1973) [hereinafter cited as CITIZENS Gum]; DAEDALUS, THE No-GRowT Soci-TY (M. Olson & H. Landsberg eds. 1974); Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass
a Law to Bind the Rights of the Whole World?, I FLA. ST. L. REV. 234 (1973); Deutsch,
Land Use Growth Controls: A Case Study of San Jose and Livermore, California, 15 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 1 (1974); Freilich & Ragsdale, Timing and Sequential Controls-The Essential
Basis for Effective Regional Planning: An Analysis of the New Directions for Land Use
Control in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Region, 58 MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1974);
Cahn, Where Do We Grow from Here?, ARCHITECTURAL FORUM, Dec. 1973 at 22; Cameron,
Growth Is a Fighting Word in Colorado's Mountain Wonderland, FORTUNE, Oct. 1973, at
148; Harris, Californians Are Saying "No" to Growth in a Spreading Revolt That Makes
Strange Allies, CAL. JOURNAL, July 1973, at 224; Morgan, Running Out of Space, HARI'EEs,
Sept. 1973, at 59.
2 CITIZENS GUIDE, at 34-36; D. Peterson, Growth Control: An Emerging National
Phenomenon at 1, Aug. 1973 (paper presented at the Third Pacific Regional Science Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii); Reilly, New Directions in Federal Land Use Legislation, URBAN
LAw ANNUAL 29, 56 (1973); Seelig & Seelig, Dissecting the Opposition to Growth, PLANNiN , June 3, 1973, at 15.

- In Keeping Oregon Green, THE CENTER MAGAZINE, Jan./Feb. 1974, at 78, Governor
Tom McCall of Oregon reported the "value" of one hundred new employees to a community
as determined by a chamber of commerce study. The gains to the community were $590,000
more personal income per year, $270,000 more bank deposits, 107 more cars registered, 174
more workers employed, four new retail establishments, and $360,000 more retail sales.
Weighed against these factors, however, were 51 additional school children, 296 more people,
the need for three new residential subdivisions, increased requirements on the social services, police and fire departments of the town, and an additional long-term debt of six million dollars. Governor McCall concluded: "It would be a long time, and perhaps never,
before the community could pay the cost of attracting one hundred new employees." See
Cahn, supra note 1; CITIzENS GUIDE at 155-59; Harris, supra note 1, at 225; Stanford
Environmental Law Society, Do New Residential Develottments Pay Their Own Wav? A
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fact is now an unanswered question. However, the romance with growth
does appear to be over for the present.
The disenchantment with growth is not going to disappear by itself.
If effort is directed at conceiving new ways to discourage development,
if governments continue to give in to the anti-growth mentality, the
situation will undoubtedly worsen for a considerable period of time. No
matter how many no-growth or slow-growth schemes are legitimized by
courts,4 clearly such schemes are not solutions to the problems presented
by our increasing population and the continuing migration to urban
areas.' The commitment of our resources to coping with the problems
of growth is a much more positive and hopeful endeavor.
Arguably, planners and others who manage a community's land
resources are unable to accomodate growth satisfactorily because they
have not taken into consideration all of the factors that influence the
land use process.6 One factor that is often overlooked is the role taxaCase Study in Half Moon Bay, California, in STANFORD ENmRONm"NTAL LAW Socwrr,
SAN JosE: SPRAWLiNG CITy, Appendix A (1971). But see R.L. MACE & W.J. Wicxxt,
OWN WAY (ULI Res. Mono. no. 15) (1968).
Do SINGLE-FArmIY HoMEs PAY Tir
4
Ordinances explicitly designed to control a community's growth rate have received a
mixed reception in the courts. The New York Court of Appeals sustained the town of
Ramapo's ordinance which was designed to slow and limit growth through determining
the timing of permitted development. Golden v. Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285
N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). Much of the commentary on the Ramapo plan is listed in Deutsch, supra note 1, at 7 n.33. More recently,
a federal district court invalidated the plan of Petaluma, California, to deal with its growth
problem by limiting the number of housing units that could be started each year. The court
found that Petaluma's scheme violated the right to travel. Construction Indus. Ass'n of
Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d 897
(9th Cir. 1975). A performance standard ordinance related to schools adopted by the City
of San Jose, California, has recently been sustained by the California Supreme Court.
Builders Ass'n of Santa Clara-Santa Cruz Counties v. City of San Jose, 13 Cal. 3d 225,
529 P.2d 582, 118 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1974). An analogous ordinance of the City of Livermore,
which was struck down at trial and by a California court of appeal, Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay v. City of Livermore, 116 Cal. Rptr. 326 (Cal. App. 1974), is on
appeal to the California Supreme Court. For a thorough analysis of the ordinances and the
political and legal issues involved in them, see Deutsch, supra note 1.
5 judge Coffin, in a well-reasoned opinion sustaining a six-acre minimum lot zone as
a temporary" measure to allow for more substantial planning efforts, recognized this
proposition: "Where there is natural population growth it has to go somewhere, unwelcome
as it may be, and in that case we do not think it should be channelled by the happenstance of what town gets its veto in first." Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of
Sanborton, 469 F.2d 956, 962 (1st Cir. 1972). Other courts in exclusionary zoning cases
have found that communities may not avoid, and indeed may be obligated to plan for,
growth. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215
A.2d 597 (1965); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390
(1959). See generally Bingham & Bostick, Exclusionary Zoning Practices: An Examination
of the Current Controversy, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1111 (1972); Lefcoe, The Public Housing
Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59 CArUt. L. RaV. 1384 (1971).
Referendum
6
For insights into some of the many planning approaches to problems of growth, see,
e.g., F. BossarmA & D. CALU.s, ME QumT REvOLUTioN nT LAim UsE CONTROL (1972);
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tion policy and practice play in determining the pattern of the landscape." Perhaps this is because local governments have been charged
with the responsibility for land use planning but have very little power
or discretion in the area of taxation.' Furthermore, no coordination or
exchange of goals or information is required between a community's
plainers and those involved in the budgeting and assessing process.!
Thus, experimentation and debate in land use planning have focused on
zoning and other regulatory powers over which local governments do
have control.
Economists have demonstrated, however, that taxes do affect the
timing, intensity, and nature of land use. ° Despite restrictions on private property rights, for the most part our system of government leaves
to the property owner the decision as to how and when land will be
used. If a community's tax policy and practice lead an owner to conclude that it would be unwise or unprofitable to develop his land in accordance with the community plan, he will not choose to so develop it.
Land use plans are not self-implementing-the cooperation of land owners subject to the plan is essential. If a local government's tax structure
discourages this cooperation, the goals of the plan may never be achieved.
This article focuses on the part the major taxes used by state and
local government-those on property, sales and income-play in the
shaping of our environment. This is not to say that tax-base sharing,"
FINKLER & PETERSON, supra note 1; Lamm & Davison, The Legal Control of Population
Growth and Distribution in a Quality Environment: The Land Use Alternatives, 49 DENVER
L.J. 1 (1972).
7 Several writers have recognized and have started to explore the relationship between
taxes and land use. See, e.g., W. ATTOE, T. HELLER & J. MORGAN, TAxATioN AND LAND
USE (1974); Bab, Taxation and Land Use Planning, 10 WLIA=TTE L.J. 439 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Bab]; Delogu, The Taxing Power as a Land Use Control Device, 45
DENVER LJ. 279 (1968); [hereinafter cited as Delogul; Gaffney, Tax Reform to Release
Land, in MODERNIZING URBAN LAND POLICY 115 (M. Clawson ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited
as Gaffney, Tax Reform]; Pickford & Shannon, Harnessing Property Taxes and Land-Use
Planning, PLANNING, Dec. 1972, at 305; Zimmerman, Tax Planning for Land Use Control,
5 URB. LAW. 639 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Zimmerman]. See also, D. HAGMAN, URBAN
PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 345-67 (1971); D. HAGMAN, PUBLIC
PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND DEVELOPMENT 749-819 (1973); G. LEFCOE,
LAND DEvELOPMENT LAW 1125-58 (2d ed. 1974).
' See text accompanying notes 36-54 infra.
' See Delogu, supra note 7, at 280. The movement toward more state and federal
involvement in the land use planning process is unlikely to alter this situation. Proposed
and adopted state planning legislation makes little reference to taxation and does not call
for cooperation and exchange of information among the relevant parties.
,0For a discussion of how taxes have been used to promote planning objectives in
other countries, see Lefcoe, Tax and Urban Design Policy, REAL ESTATE L.J. (forthcoming).
, See Lyall, Tax-Base-Sharing: A Fiscal Aid Towards More Rational Land Use
Planning, 41 J. OF THE Am. INST. OF PLANNERS 90 (1975). Tax base-sharing allows
participating local governments to share in property tax revenues derived from increases
in the assessed valuation of certain real property of all the governmental units in the
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construction taxes,"2 tax-increment financing,"3 and numerous other inventive and specialized tax programs are not important or significant.
It may be, however, that some of these taxes would not be needed if
the basic taxes on which local governments rely could be coordinated
4
with the land use objectives of a community.' So little has been done
or said with respect to the impact of these most important taxes on land
use planning, that it seems appropriate to begin there and leave other
taxes for another time.
Part I of this paper compares taxation with regulation as a means
of achieving land use goals. Part II briefly describes the legal framework in which taxation must operate. Part III presents a detailed review of much of the empirical work that relates to the relationship between taxes and land use. Finally, Part IV points out the need for
additional work in this area, and offers some ideas based on existing
studies about how taxation may be used to influence land use.

I.

TAxATION AND THE POLICE POWER AS MEANS OF ACHIEVING
LAND USE GOALS

A. The Legitimacy of Using Taxes as Planning Tools
It is appropriate at the outset to examine the legitimacy of utilizing
taxation to achieve land use goals. One objection that might be leveled
against the use of taxes to control land use is that the taxing power
exists solely to provide government with a mechanism for financing its
activities. Using the power for other purposes, then, constitutes a misuse, if not an abuse, of the power. 5 However, tax laws have policy
program. It is designed to shift local governments' attitude from one of competition for
the good tax ratables to a spirit of cooperation that will promote sound land use planning
on a metropolitan or regional basis. Schemes of this sort have been sustained in Minnesota
, 222 N.W.2d 523
Minn. and New Jersey. See Village of Burnsville v. Onischuk, (1974), appeal denied, 420 U.S. 916 (1975); Meadowlands Reg. Redev. Agency v. State, 64
304 A.2d 545 (1973).
N.J. 35,
12 The construction tax is imposed under the taxing power on all new residential
construction in a municipality. The money generated by this tax is earmarked for capital
improvement programs. See Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of
Newark, 18 Cal. App. 3d 107, 95 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1971). A complete review of the California
experience with this type of tax is contained in Ducker, The Use of Construction Taxes
by California Cities, January 1973 (unpublished seminar paper prepared for Professor
Donald Hagman's Land Planning Seminar, UCLA, a copy of which is on file with the
author). See also Hammer, Siler, George Associates, An Economic Analysis of the Development Impact Tax in Oregon, January, 1974 (a report prepared for the National Association
of Home Builders, a copy of which is on file with the author).
13 See Hegg, Tax-Increment Financing of Urban Renewal-Redevelopment Incentive
Without Federal Assistance, 2 RtAL EsTrATE L.J. 575 (1973).
14See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 644.
IsSee id. at 641-43 and sources cited therein. But cf. United States v. Kahriger, 345
U.S. 22 (1953). The converse of the situation may also be true. That is, the police power
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objectives beyond merely raising revenue.'" Even if that were the only
legitimate goal of a tax system, choices would still have to be made
among a variety of taxes, each of which has the capacity to raise the
needed funds. Selecting a tax or group of taxes from among the available taxing alternatives necessitates deciding what to tax (wealth, land,
buildings, income, consumption, sales, business licenses, etc.) and at
what rates. This choice will unavoidably have policy impacts.
The use of taxes to achieve or complement growth management is
also subject to attack for its potential arbitrariness. A tax plan that
favors or promotes a particular land use indirectly taxes all other land
uses more heavily. This potential inequity leads most states to prescribe
that taxes, and particularly the property tax, be levied at a uniform rate,
and that all properties of the same class be taxed alike.'" Because the
administration of a tax can create inequities even if the tax itself does
not, the manner in which real estate is assessed is subject to considerable regulation, including administrative appeal systems in many states.a
Thus, two forms of unfairness might result if taxes were used to
affect land use goals. On the one hand it might be argued that it is
discriminatory to assess, for instance, farm land ripe for development,
on its value in farm use, while nearby non-farm land is assessed at its
fair market value (increased significantly by the development potential).
Alternatively, it could be argued that if the tax law favors farmers, the
may not justify an ordinance that is primarily designed to raise revenue, rather than to
effectuate legitimate regulatory purposes. A number of ordinances requiring the payment
of a fee analogous to the construction tax discussed in note 11 supra, have been struck down
as unauthorized taxes and not valid regulations (or fees incident thereto) because the primary purpose of the fee was to raise revenue. See, e.g., Daniels v. Borough of Point Pleasant,
23 N.J. 357, 129 A.2d 265 (1957); Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
16 See, e.g., W. ATTOE, T. HELLER & J. MORGAN, TAXATION AND LAMs UsE 2 (1974);
Gaffney, Tax Reform, supra note 7; Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied
Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance,
84 HAav. L. REV. 352, 353-59 (1970). Professor Surrey argues against the use of tax incentives in the federal tax system as a means of achieving policy objectives in Surrey, Tax
Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct
Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV. 705 (1970).
'"See, e.g., CAL. CoNsT. art. 13, § 1; Ky. CoNsT. § 171. Some courts have struck
down preferential tax treatment for agricultural land use, see the discussion at notes 208-61
infra, on the grounds that it violates the uniformity provisions of the state constitution.
Boyne v. State, 80 Nev. 160, 390 P.2d 225 (1964). Maryland's initial effort to differentially
assess farmland through legislation was struck down in State Tax Comm'n v. Wakefield,
222 Md. 543, 161 A.2d 676 (1960). However, similar legislation was validated by the
Maryland Court of Appeals after a constitutional amendment authorizing such a program
had been adopted. Supervisor v. Asop, 232 Md. 188, 192 A.2d 484 (1963). Other courts
have determined that these tax relief programs for farm and open space uses do not
run afoul of uniformity requirements. Bensalem Township School Dist. v. County Comm'rs.
8 Pa. Cmwlth. 411, 303 A.2d 258 (1973); Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So. 2d 833 (FIL 1963)
18 See, e.g., CAL. CoNsr. art. 13, §§ 16-18.
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favoritism might be compounded by assessors underassessing farms even
more than intended under an assessment program designed to give farmers a tax break to preserve land in agricultural uses.
In response to the argument that land use goals should not influence the design of tax systems, it can be said that although the tax
system may seem neutral, it actually discriminates against some in its
overall impact.' 9 Using the same example, farmers might contend that
it would be unfair to tax their land at other than its value in farm use
because speculators and subdividers have boosted the going rate for
neighboring lands based on a belief that such property is within the
path of development. Not only does the farmer wish to continue farming, but the insufficient demand for all the land in their area and the
large sunk costs in his farming operations would preclude him from
realizing the full gain on his land. Yet, he is taxed as if he could easily
liquidate his holdings profitably. Also, agricultural users contend that
they consume less in the way of public services (fire, police, and schools)
than subdivided lands. Therefore, farmers submit that they should be
treated differently because they are in fact distinguishable from other
land users. Uniformity requirements, it may be argued, have no application when two land uses are essentially different.
Next, consider the effect the official sanctioning of a tax break for
farmers might have on assessors. Will assessors be encouraged to increase the tax break by informal practices? Indeed, the opposite may
result. Underassessment may have been taking place before the passage
of a differential assessment law because of the sympathy assessors felt
for hard-pressed farmers." Legitimitizing this attitude by legislative
tax relief programs, (whether for farmers, home owners, the elderly,
or any group which attracts "off the record" sympathy) may actually
19 Since no one has the same amount and mix of resources as anyone else and the
same demands for those resources, it would seem that no tax can be precisely neutral. If the
lack of tax neutrality does influence land use decisions, then whether desirable or not and
whether intended or not, a tax system will in fact partially determine land development
patterns. It would seem to make sense to have this effect be a positive one. Cf. Heller,
The Theory of Property Taxation and Land Use Restrictions, 1974 Wisc. L. RIv. 751,
764-55. But see Bab, supra note 7, at 443-50.
20
Although he says that the assessed values may be climbing toward market values,

Professor Hagman reports:
In the past [vacant rural-urban or fringe land] may have enjoyed an illegal
preference because of a practice of undervaluing, strong taxpayer resistance
accompanied by assessors' sympathy, a recognition of basic policy beliefs that

vacant fringe land should be valued lower, and an inability of assessors to make
accurate assessments.
Hagman, Open Space Planning and Property Taxation-Some Suggestions, 1964 Wisc. L.
Rav. 628, 636-37.
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reduce arbitrariness in the administration of tax laws." In any event,
the answer to improper assessment practices is to clean up those practices.
However arbitrary the current assessment practice may be, there
is no evidence that zoning and other land use or environment controls
are any less capricious. The corruptibility of the zoning process is often
reported. 2 Perhaps tax programs could be designed with fewer opportunities for abuse of discretion; it must certainly be the case that few
tax systems could be imagined with as many opportunities for abuse as
we have suffered in the administration of zoning ordinances.
The central function of taxation will continue to be the raising of
the money necessary to run government. A corollary function of taxation might be as a land use planning device. The use of taxes for this
purpose is compelling because whatever taxes are imposed will have
land use impacts. This is especially true so long as the tax system is
not more arbitrary than the current processes through which the development of land is controlled.
B. The Distinct Impacts of Tax and Police Power Measures
Assuming that a state or community has recognized the unavoidable effect taxes will have on land use, and has decided to employ taxes
as tools in its growth management efforts, the question that arises is
when and how tax measures can be useful. This can be partially answered by examining the general characteristics of taxes and police
power regulations.
Assuming that optimal allocation of scarce land resources is a desirable goal, taxation may be preferred to zoning and other land use
regulations when it will more efficiently distribute land among various
2 'A
recent study found that innercity housing property is grossly overassessed
compared to stable or upwardly transitional neighborhoods in the same metropolitan areas.
The administration of the property tax in the cities studied was determined to contribute
to urban blight and poor-quality housing. G. PETERSON, A. SOLOMAN, H. MADjID & W.
APGAR, PROPERTY TAxEs, HOUSING AND THE CITIES 52-57
(1973) [hereinafter cited as
PROPERTY TAXES, HOUSING]. If owners of property in blighted or transitional areas seem
like good candidates for the assessor's sympathy, the difference between the favorable
assessments on the rural-urban fringe and the harsh assessments in the innercity may be
explained in part by the traditionally slow adjustment of assessment levels. This works
to the benefit of the person on the fringe of development whose property is rising in
value, but works to the detriment of the innercity landowner who needs a reduced assessment.2 2
See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEmS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN
CITY 226-27 (1969); Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Control, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 681, 701-02 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Ellickson] and the newspaper accounts and other commentary cited in the accompanying
notes. Ellickson refers to the uncovered abuses as only the tip of the iceber, Id. at 702 n.74.
See generally R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAmE (1966).
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uses. 3 Basic economic analysis tells us that market transactions will
lead to optimal land usage in a world of perfect information where there
are no impediments to bargaining among the participants in the market."4
Any government interference in such a situation would only impair the
resource allocation process. But land markets do not even approximate
this economic model. Transactions and decisions made in any land use
market will regularly have spillover effects on others in the same market
and may influence other land markets." There is no reason in such a
situation for the government to avoid interference. The problem is deciding when and how to 'intervene. If the goal is optimally allocating
land resources, a government should intervene whenever its activity
will promote and not hinder the flow of land to its best use. That form
of intervention should be selected which is the most promotive of optimal land use. 6 For our purposes, the most efficient course of action
will be that which27 minimizes the sum of nuisance, prevention, and administrative costs.
Police power measures, especially zoning, are characteristically allor-nothing propositions. That is, they either prohibit certain uses altogether, or direct how property must be used, if at all. From an efficiency
standpoint the danger is that the regulation may be too restrictive or
not restrictive enough. If either extreme occurs, the sum of nuisance,
prevention, and administrative costs will not be minimized. For example, an overly severe zoning measure may do a good job at eliminating
23

This is not to say that social objectives, the distribution of wealth in our society
and basic equity concerns, are not appropriate factors to consider in the process of deciding
how land resources should be utilized. See notes 272-74 infra and text accompanying.
Economists often avoid consideration of the equitable effects of a particular program, see
Ellickson, supra note 22, at 690-91, and propose instead that wealth redistribution or the
correction of injustices that may arise from a particular policy choice be accomplished by
direct cash transfers. Without arguing whether the only important objective is the optimal
allocation of resources, it certainly should be a primary concern of any policy-maker.
24 Ellickson, supra note 22, at 683. The attempt here to compare taxes and police
power regulations as land use control devices has been substantially influenced by Professor Ellickson's development of criteria for the evaluation of land use control systems
and their application to zoning. See id. at 633-711.
25
Also referred to as "externalities," spillovers are impacts from an activity on nonparticipants
in the activity which may be either beneficial or harmful to the party affected.
26
Ellickson describes a number of courses of action from which a government can
choose ranging from doing nothing except providing a way for a private citizen to enforce
a freely negotiated contract against a defaulting party to collective directives to landowners, ordering them to affirmatively act in a way they otherwise would not. Ellickson,
supra note 22, at 686-87.
27 Nuisance costs are those which depreciate the usefulness and value of land resulting
from the nature of the use to which the nuisance-maker has put his or her land. Prevention
costs are those expenditures made or opportunity costs borne by affected landowners or
the nuisance-maker to reduce the nuisance costs. Administrative costs include those incurred
to acquire information, negotiate transactions or agreements and the costs of policing. Id.
at 688-89.
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nuisance-like commercial uses from a residential neighborhood. However, in doing so it may force affected residents to suffer long trips to
shop, a cost of prevention that probably exceeds the suffering that would
result if some commercial land uses were located in the residential neighborhood. Similarly, nuisance costs to neighboring landowners may be
greater than prevention costs if the regulation does not go far enough
in proscribing what activities will not be allowed. The efficiency of a
regulation, then, is a function of its precision.2 8 In a few clear-cut cases,
governments can have some confidence that a regulation will promote
efficient land usage.29 Otherwise, it would seem desirable to give the
market some flexibility to respond to the governmental intervention and
correct errors in judgment that might have been made.
Taxation does allow some amount of market response to government interference in the land development process. To some extent,
each landower can choose whether and at what level to incur a tax. An
owner's decision presumably reflects his or her attitude about whether
or not the land use is worth the cost of the tax. If the tax represents
all or part of the societal costs that result from a particular land use,
then the landowner is in effect put to the choice between the nuisance
costs he imposes and the costs of prevention. The rational decision that
we must assume will be reached should promote the optimal allocation
of our land resources. Under this analysis the level of the tax would
be critical, and must be periodically adjusted based upon an analysis of
how the market is responding to the tax at its existing level, and the
changing social and environmental context. One implicit assumption
here is that some quantity of a particular land use may be desirable in
an area, but not all that activity that would take place if land users got
a free ride, that is, if they had no responsibility for spillovers from their
land use. It is probably efficient to have some basic commercial uses in
residential areas. A properly calibrated tax would permit the right
amount of such use and discourage all others. Regulations would either
exclude these uses altogether or permit too many to operate.
2' The very simple examples given to illustrate the consequences as far as efficiency is
concerned of an ill-conceived regulation ignore administrative costs. These should be higher
from both design and enforcement perspectives the more specific and detailed a regulation
is. Attempts to save administrative expenses may, therefore, cause intolerable inaccuracies
in a regulation.
29 Under Ellickson's scheme, regulation would sometimes be appropriate where an
activity causes insubstantial injury to a great many surrounding landowners which when
added up may exceed the value of the activity to the nuisance-maker. Relying on nuisance
remedies the foundation of Ellickson's "privatized" land use control system) in such a
situation would result in an intolerable administrative burden. Also, he suggests that mandatory standards may be the best way to control subdivision design. Ellickson, supra note 22,
at 761-62, 772-79.
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The use of taxation might also increase involvement of state and
regional governments in land use planning. Since the power to tax is
in the state and has been exercised primarily at that level,3" it is perhaps
a more logical and politically acceptable place for the state to increase
its role. On the other hand, resistance can be expected from local governments when the state tries to interpose itself in the planning process
which has long been primarily delegated to local government." In addition, since the interjurisdictional differences in tax practice and rates is
one area where taxation certainly impacts on land use in a significant
way,32 paying increased attention to taxation may lead to neutralization
of undesirable tax differential effects on population movement, locational
decisions, and the pattern of urban expansion.
Moreover, taxes raise revenue, a benefit regulations do not offer.
Monies generated can be used to defray the social costs the taxed activities generate or to improve locales where planners would like to see
more development.33 Funds raised from taxes imposed to further a land
use aim would also reduce the need to employ those taxes which now
significantly interfere with achievement of land use objectives.
Finally, taxes may be perceived differently by developers than are
regulations. A tax may not be viewed as so great an impediment to a
project by the landowner or developer that he will challenge the tax.
If the prohibited use is the most profitable land use, however, effort and
funds are likely to be expended to seek a change in the regulations.
Avoiding the regulation becomes a do-or-die issue. Such will not normally be the case when a tax applies to a proposed development. Seldom would the tax be isolated out of all the costs associated with a
project as the one that needs to be reduced or eliminated if the project
is to be viable. Further, because the tax would have general application,
it is not likely the owner or developer will see the measure as a special
hardship.
Increased reliance on taxation in land use planning does not imply
the total abandonment of current land use control techniques. Such a
suggestion is infeasible politically and would be unwise as well. In some
instances regulation makes more sense than taxation as a way of achieving a particular land use. For example, zoning would seem to be preferable to taxation for the maintenance of flood plains. How would a tax
30 See text accompanying notes 36-39 infra.
31 See generally CITzENs Gmoa at 61-71; THE QuTr REVOLuTION IN LAND USE
CoNTRoL, supra note 6.
'2 See text accompanying notes 124-32 infra.
" See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 643.
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be constructed to achieve this objective? A tax rate which would be
fair to the owner, given the low intensity use the community expects
on the property, does nothing to assure development consistent with the
character of the land. Since the acceptable uses of flood plain land can
be determined without too much difficulty, and since flood plains can be
identified with some precision, it makes sense to use regulation rather
than taxation to achieve the desired land use. 4 It is in those situations
where the optimal use of land is not so apparent that taxation may be
preferable to traditional forms of regulation.

II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

OF THE TAXING POWER

Courts striking down exclusionary land use practices often say that
the police power cannot be used as a way of avoiding the financial burdens that are thought to accompany an increased population." Without countenancing these exclusionary objectives, it might be said on behalf of these municipalities that they are putting to use the only weapon
at their disposal to combat the fiscal crunch in which they find themselves. From its inception the zoning power has been delegated by the
states to their local governments, and courts have allowed a great deal
of manueuvering within the powers granted. Such is not the case with
the power to tax. Which taxes can be imposed, and sometimes the
maximum tax rates, are tightly controlled at the state level. 6 Constitutional provisions regarding equal protection of the laws and tax uniformity further constrain any municipality that might seek to cope with
its money crisis through the taxing power. Perhaps the contrast between the amount of discretion local governments have in the taxing
and zoning areas can be partially explained by the deeply-imbedded distrust of the power to tax Americans seem to have." Whatever the
34 For a good presentation of the practical and legal problems surrounding floodplains,
see Plater, The Takings Issue in a Natural Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power, 52

TExAs L. REv. 201 (1974).
3
sSee, e.g., Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); Appeal
of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
36For more detailed analysis of the legal questions involved in the distribution of
the taxing power between state and local governments than is presented here see E.

McQumN, 16 MuNucPAL CORPORanONS § 44 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McQumml]; Antieau, Municipal Power to Tax-Its Constitutional Limitations, 8 VAND. L.
REv. 698 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Antieaul.
37 The classic statement in this regard was made by Daniel Webster arguing against
state taxation of the Bank of the United States in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819):
An unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to destroy, because there
is a limit beyond which no institution and no property can bear taxation.
Id. at 327. See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 641-43.
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reason, creative taxation for land use objectives is inhibited if a town
must impose every tax it is authorized to levy at the maximum rate
legally permitted or politically feasible in order to meet its continuing
financial obligations.
Although the ability to raise revenue is essential to local governments, in general the taxing power is considered an attribute of sovereignty which inheres in the state legislature and not in local governments. 8 Municipal governments have no power to tax unless the power
is delegated to them. The extent of any delegation by the state is likely
to be narrowly construed by the courts, who are unwilling to make inferences concerning what portion of the taxing power the legislature
has intended to pass on to local governments. 9 Cities are dependent,
then, on clear grants of taxing authority from their state government.
States have picked and chosen from among the various taxes those
they will keep for themselves and those that will be shared with or given
completely to local governments. This is illustrated nicely by the way
the three taxes with which this article is concerned, those on property,
sales, and income, have been treated. The power to impose a tax on
real property has typically been passed on to local governments and constitutes their main source of revenue.4 ° The state has, of course, continued to enforce uniformity requirements through assessment laws and
has retained the power to prescribe what property is exempt from property taxation.' This transfer of the real property tax to local governments may be contrasted with the firm control the state government has
mainained over the income tax. Only nine states in 1972 authorized
local governments to impose an income tax."2 There is even doubt
3 See McQuILan€ at §§ 44.03, 44.05; Antieau, supra note 36, at 698-99. Cf. United
States v. New Orleans, 98 U.S. 381 (1878). There is some question about where the locus
on the taxing power is when a municipality has home rule powers. See McQui=rtn at
§ 44.06a; Antieau, supra note 36, at 698-700; Note, The Validity of San Francisco's Commuter Tax, 20 HAST. L.. 813, 814-16 (1969).
39
See McQumLLI at § 44.05; Antieau, supra note 36, at 700-03.
0
4 See notes 72-79 infra and text accompanying. This delegation is indicated by the
fact that the property tax raised over 36.7 billion dollars revenue at the local level and
only about 1.1 billion at the state level in the United States in 1971. STATISTICAL ABSTRACr
or

=

UmTED STATES 1973, at 413, table no. 660 [hereinafter cited as 1973 STAT. AB-

strcT]. In California the decision to relinquish the property tax to local governments was
made pursuant to a plan drawn up in 1905 and adopted in 1910 to correct tax inequities
that existed as a consequence of the property tax being a basic revenue source for both
state and local governments. Januta, The Municipal Revenue Crisis: California Problems
and Possibilities,56 CALI,. L. Rnv. 1525, 1529 (1968).
41 See McQuILIN at §§ 44.63-.65.
42 ADvIsoRY COwn.ssIoN ON INTERGOvERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE-LOcAL FnTANcEs:
SNIFICANT FEATURES AND SUGGESTED LEGISLATION 308-09

as ACIR 1972].

(1972

ed.) [hereinafter cited

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:27

whether cities with home rule powers can levy an income tax.' The
treatment of the general retail sales tax represents a middle ground. It
is imposed at the state level by almost every state,4 and is the best
source of revenue in many of them. However, many states have been
willing to share this revenue source with their local governments, " "
allowing local sales taxes to piggyback on top of the state tax."
In addition to the state legislature's ability to prescribe what taxes
can be levied, the development of a tax policy by a municipality is handcuffed by either constitutional or statutory limitations on the maximum
tax rate that a local government can adopt." There is little doubt that
such provisions are valid, including those a legislature may enact when
the state constitution does not speak to the matter.49 Restrictions on the
allowable property tax rate are not infrequent. They may establish an
overall limit on the total tax levied against property by all taxing jurisdictions, limit the rate certain governmental units may charge, or control the increase in rates by restricting the increase to a percentage of
the increase in the previous year." Those states that permit local income and sales taxes usually set the upper limit on the amount of each
tax that can be collected. The local sales tax rates hover in the area of
one to two percent.5 " Colorado, however, allows a local rate of up to
four percent,5" which should permit municipalities some flexibility in
43

Compare City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Col. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1959)

with Dooley v. City of Detroit, 370 Mich. 194, 121 N.W.2d 724 (1963). See Januta,

supra note 40, at 1540-56; Comment, The Municipal Income Tax and State Preemption in
California, 11 SANTA CLARA LAW. 343 (1971).
44
Only Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon do not levy a sales
tax. Due, Development of Retail Sales Taxes in the 19 6 0's and 1970's, in 0. OLDMAN & F.
SCHOETTLE, STATE AND LOCAL TAXES AND FINANCE 458 (1974) [hereinafter cited as OLDMAN & SCHOETTLE].
4 5
OLDMAN & SCHOETTLE at 444.
46 Due reports that 23 states permit local sales taxes and that over 50 percent of
cities over 100,000 have a local sales tax. OLDMAN & SCHOETTLE at 463. In Alaska, which
does not levy a state sales tax, there is widespread use of municipal sales taxes. Id. at 458.
47 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §§ 7200 et seq. (1970). See ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS,
FEDERAL-STATE-LocAL
FINANCES: SIGNIFICANT
FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM at 84-89, table 59 (1973-74 ed.) [hereinafter cited as

ACIR 1973-74].
41 In
politically
the courts
19 Id.
50

the absence of a tax rate ceiling a municipality may tax to the extent it is
practical. The reasonableness of a tax is primarily a legislative matter with which
will seldom interfere. See McQUiLLiN at § 44.25.
at § 44.26.
See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 43068, 43072 (West Supp. 1975); MIcH. CoNsT. art.

9, § 6.
Howards, Property-Tax-Rate Limits: A View of Local Government, in PROPERTY
USA 165, 169 (R. Lindholm ed. 1967).
52 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 7202 (West Supp. 1975). See ACIR 1973-74 at
84-89, table 59.
53 COLO. REV. STATS. ANN. § 29-2-108 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
5
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designing a tax program. Local income tax rates are also generally set
in the one percent range. 4
Finally, local tax programs are circumscribed by constitutional provisions regarding equal protection of the law and tax uniformity. 5
Broadly put, classifications made by communities for purposes of taxation must be based on reasonable distinctions which bear some relationship to the purposes of the tax legislation.5 6 Further, the same method
of assessment and the same tax rate are to be applied to properties similarly classified. Exact equality is not demanded, but courts will protect
taxpayers from intentional and arbitrary discrimination and from irrational assessment practices.5 ' Unquestionably, the courts should stand
ready to strike down harsh and unfair tax policies. However, as in
many other areas of the law, it is difficult to understand where the line
between the capricious and the rational will be drawn.
Lack of clarity in the standard against which a tax policy or practice will be judged can deter attempts at tax reforms that might aid in
solving land use problems. This is especially true with respect to the
property tax where uniformity and equal protection guarantees play their
most significant role. Nevertheless, these provisions do not appear to
hamper a more aggressive use of the property tax to promote land use
planning objectives to the extent one might suppose.
In San Antonio School District v. Rodriquez,58 the Supreme Court
indicated in the context of a challenge to local property tax financing of
schools that state and local governments are allowed broad discretion
in formulating their tax policies,5 9 and quoted the following passage
60
from Madden v. Kentucky:
The broad discretion as to classification possessed by a legislature
in the field of taxation has long been recognized... [T]he passage of
time has only served to underscore the wisdom of that recognition of
-5 See, e.g., MIcH. CouP. LAWS ANN. § 141.503, 141.611 (1967). Michigan cities
over
one million population are empowered to levy up to a two percent tax under this law.
For a listing of rates across the country see ACIR 1973-74 at 291-94, table 150.
" For an interesting application of this principle see Andrews v. Lathrop, Vt.-,
315 A.2d 860 (1974), upholding the Vermont land gains tax which seeks to deter speculation
in land by imposing a tax on the transfer of land which is steeper the more profit made

and the shorter the holding period.

"See generally 71 Am. Ju-. 2d, State and Local Taxation §§ 150-90 (1973); Antieau,
supra note 36, at 738-45.
"'See, e.g., Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-28 (1958); District of
Columbia v. Green, 310 A.2d 848, 854-57 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
58411
U.S. 1 (1973).
9
d. at 40-41. See also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356
(1973).
60309 U.S. 83 (1940). This case upheld a higher tax rate on out-of-state bank deposits
than was charged against in-state bank deposits.
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the large area of discretion which is needed by a legislature in formulating sound tax policies.. . It has ... been pointed out that in taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest
freedom in classification. Since the members of the legislature necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this Court cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only
by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is hostile and
oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes .... ."
This language is almost an invitation to state governments who
would like to have their tax programs play a more positive role in the
land use planning process. With proper enabling legislation the same
amount of flexibility and discretion can be given to local governments.
The several cases that have upheld statutes allowing preferential
tax treatment of farm and open space land without a specific constitutional provision authorizing such a tax break further support the notion
that the courts will tolerate tax policies designed to promote land use
goals.62 Among other reasons, special tax treatment of agricultural and
open space land is justified because "[c]lassification of property according to use is valid and constitutional."63 If the courts are willing to
allow fairly wide latitude in classifying property for tax purposes according to use, state and local governments will have acquired a potentially valuable tool. The agricultural/open space versus all other land
uses is probably the strongest case for separating out a land use and
assessing at its value in that use as opposed to its "highest and best use."
The policy objectives are clear-cut, and judges are not too uncomfortable dealing with the question of when land qualifies for the special tax
treatment the law allows. Whether finer distinctions would be tolerated
is uncertain. Consider, for example, how a court would react to a statute
which classifies agricultural land on the fringe of urban expansion separately for tax purposes from all other land, including other agricultural
land and neighboring fringe land not in agricultural use. In such a piece
of legislation arbitrary? The arguments for and against the validity
and wisdom of such a measure should be fairly apparent, but who can
say with any confidence how a court in the future would respond to
such a piece of legislation?
61 Id. at 87-88.
62 See, e.g., Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1963); Elwell v. County of Hennepin,

, 221 N.W.2d 538 (1974); Bensalem Township School Dist. v. County
Minn. Comm'rs 8 Pa. Cmwlth. 411, 303 A.2d 258 (1973). A discussion of a number of the constitutional problems that are involved in assessing these tax programs is presented in
Hagman, supra note 20, at 640-45.
221 N.W.2d 538, 546 (1974).
Minn. -,
63 Elwell v. County of Hennepin, -
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Lastly, the upholding of the concept of tax base-sharing by the
highest courts of Minnesota 6 and New Jersey" implies that the courts
will be receptive to innovative tax schemes designed to alleviate some
of the land use and fiscal problems faced by metropolitan areas. The
Minnesota case concerned the constitutionality of the Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Act66 passed in 1971 to cope with land use and fiscal
problems faced by some cities in the Twin Cities area as a result of
population growth and suburban expansion. This legislation provided
for the pooling of 40 percent of the increase in the tax base of all commercial and industrial property in the affected seven county (encompassing some 250 municipalities) area. The money collected is distributed to the various governmental units under a formula designed to reflect the needs of the local units for revenue and their own capacity to
provide the needed funds. As the court reports:
The effect of the system is to reallocate the area-wide tax base
thus pooled to all municipalities in direct relation to need and inverse
relation to fiscal capacity. Need is measured by population, and fiscal
capacity is measured by the market value of property per capita. Consequently, the units of government with large population and low fiscal capacity are favored in reallocation
over those with small population and high fiscal capacity. 7
The tax base-sharing notion was determined to be consistent with
Minnesota's uniformity provision.6 The challengers had argued that
state case law held that those who pay a tax must receive a tangible and
specific benefit from the expenditures of the funds generated in order
for the tax to satisfy the uniformity requirement. The court found the
challengers' argument had merit,6 9 but found that a strict and literal
interpretation of the concept of special benefit no longer served the constitutional requirement of uniformity. "' Given the mobility and high degree of political, social, and economic interdependence in the metropol64Village of Burnsville v. Onischuk, Minn. -,
222 N.W.2d 523 (1974), appeal
denied,
420
U.S.
916
(1975).
65
Meadowlands Reg. Redev. Agency v. State, 63 N.J. 35, 304 A.2d 545 (1973). See

Meadowlands Reg. Redev. Agency v. State, 112 N.J. Super. 89, 270 A.2d 418 (1970),
which is the trial court decision in this case. Its reasoning on the issues of whether the
statute in question was an unconstitutional delegation of taxing power by the state or an
unconstitutional allotment of local property tax revenues was approved by the New Jersey
Supreme Court without discussion. Meadowlands Reg. Redev. Agency v. State, 63 N.J.
35, 40,
304 A.2d 545, 547 (1973).
66
Mn. STAT. ANN. §§ 473.01 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
67
Village of Burnsville v. Onischuk, Minn. at - , 222 N.W.2d at 525-26.
68
MINN. CoNsT. art. 9, § 1 provides, "Itlaxes shall be uniform upon the same class of
subjects,
and shall be levied and collected for public purposes ....
69
Village of Burnsville v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523, 530.
70 Id.
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itan area, the court was willing to sanction the theory of the Fiscal
Disparities Act that the residents of one municipality do benefit from
amenities and improvements in other towns in the area to a degree
sufficient to satisfy the constitutional demand of uniformity."'
The continuing willingness of courts to defer to state and local
judgments on tax matters and the attitudes expressed in the cases discussed here allow the conclusion that the use of taxation to promote
land use objectives will receive favorable reception by the courts. The
tax power resides in the state and is tightly held at that level through
limited delegation of the type of taxes local governments can impose
and through limits on tax rates. Effective utilization of taxes in the land
use planning process, therefore, depends on state legislation and initiative.
III. WHAT

Is

ALREADY KNOWN:

ECONOMIC

REPORTS ON PROPERTY, SALES, AND INCOME TAXES

A. The Property Tax
Since the property tax is probably the most significant tax affecting
land use, it is appropriate to begin this report of economic studies on
taxes and land use with this form of taxation. Its importance is magnified because the levy is on the land and improvements, making the
impact on the price of land and land use a direct one.
In 1973 the property tax produced approximately 45 billion dollars
in revenues. 2 The property tax represents approximately 40 percent"
of the total tax revenues raised by state and local governments, and approximately 23 percent" of state and local revenues from all sources.
Examining available data yields some interesting insights. There
is great disparity among the states as to how much the property tax is
relied upon as a revenue source, ranging from 14.8 percent of total receipts in Alabama, to 59.1 percent of total receipts in New Hampshire.75
The burden imposed by the property tax differs significantly across the
country. The average property tax payment on middle income homes,
Id. at 532.
72 PROPERTY TAXES, HOUSING at 1. In comparison with other taxes used by state and
local governments, the property tax generates 17 percent more total dollars than sales and
gross receipts taxes, which accounted for 34 percent of total state and local tax revenues,
and generated 150 percent more dollars than did state and local personal and corporate income taxes, which accounted for 16 percent of total tax revenues for state and local governments. These percentages are based on calculations made from data in 1973 STAT. ABSTRAcr,
at 419,
table 668.
13 Based on calculations made from 1973 STAT. ABSTRAcr at 419, table 668, by dividing
total data in state and local taxes by property tax revenues.
74 Id. at 411, figure 28.
75 ACIR 1973-74 at 30, table 18. The average is 39.9 percent. Id.
71
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according to 1969 figures, showed that Louisiana homeowners only pay
$70.00 per year, while the rate in New Jersey is $626.00 per year.7 As
a percentage of income, the property tax can be as high as the 10.8 percent which Boston residents were found to be paying in 1970."7
A staggering fact which emerges from close reading of available
information is the sheer number of governmental units which employ
property taxes. Out of the total 78,00078 units of state and local government in existence in 1971, some 66,000"' have property taxing power.
Thus, careful attention to the land use impact of the property tax is
called for if for no other reason than the pervasiveness of the tax. A
third feature which stands out about the property tax is the heavy share
of the burden carried by land devoted to residential uses. Residential uses may contribute as much as 50 percent of total property tax
80
revenues.
1. Basic Effects of the Property Tax
The property tax, like other taxes, acts as a cost to those who must
bear it, and accordingly can become a disincentive associated with engaging in the use of taxed property." Property taxes can become costs
to land users in two ways. Where there is an identity between the property and the user of property, property taxes become costs through tax
capitalization.82 Where the owner of taxed property is not the user of
the property (e.g., a renter), the property tax becomes a cost by tax
shifting where the expense of the tax is passed on to the land user by
the owner who is liable for it. In either case the presence of these costs
76

ACIR 1972 at 234, table 102. This table also calculates the effective tax rate per
$100 of value. This New Jersey rate was $2.99 and Louisiana's rate was $.43. See aso
ACIR 1973-74 at 174-75, tables 103 & 104, which present data concerning the average
affective property tax rates on FHA insured homes for the period from 1958-71.
77
ACIR 1972 at 62-73, table 39. This table shows the great interjurisdictional differences in the property tax. The intrajurisdictional uniformity of property taxes as a percentage of income across income classes is being seriously challenged. See PRorErY TAXES,
HousING, supra note 22.
78 1973 STAT. ABSTRAcT at 412, table 659.
79 Id.
80
NATIONAL CoManISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, IMPACT OP THE PROPERTY TAX: EcoNOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR URBAN PROBLEMS, printed for the Jt. Econ. Comm. Cong. of the
United States, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1968).
81 Economists generally believe that an increase in the price of a good activity will
lead to a decrease in the quantity which consumers will demand of such a good or activity.
This generalization is subject to the qualification that the decrease in demand is in part a
function of how indispensable the good or activity is. See generally P. SAm&E1sON, EcoNoIcs
part 4 (8th ed. 1970).
82
Basically tax capitalization means the tax will cause a decrease in the value of the
land equal to the amount of the tax. That is, property values are inversely related to property taxes, so that the imposition of a property tax or increase in such a tax will reduce
property value.
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will be taken into account by land users in formulating their land use
decisions.
Tax capitalization and tax shifting can be offset by benefit capitalization or additional tax shifting. Both of these reduce the impact of
the property tax on the primary land user. Benefit capitalization focuses
on the impact of the value of the goods and services which are financed
by tax revenues. Generally, property values are directly related to the
provision of benefits financed by tax revenues.83 Additional tax shifting
to others than the actual user of the property can occur when the land
user employs the taxed property as an input of production for goods
which will be sold to others. The tax or increase in the tax may be
passed on to customers as a cost of production.
2. Investigations of Property Tax Capitalization
Studies of property tax capitalization concentrate on owner-occupied
residential land uses and agricultural land uses. The lack of studies on
tax capitalization in the business and industrial context may be due in
part to testing problems which arise when there are infrequent property
sales to use as a basis for making value comparisons."4 It may also be
because of some uncertainties about whether capitalization will occur in
a given instance.8 " Owner-occupied homes are a good situation in which
to study tax capitalization because there is little problem in identifying
the tax-bearer. When renters and customers become candidates for sharing all or part of a tax through tax shifting, the capitalization process
becomes harder to study.8 6
(a) Tax capitalization on agricultural land
The earliest studies of property tax capitalization in the United
States concerned agricultural properties. In all, three basic studies have
83 Both benefits such as police and fire protection which are tied directly to property
and benefits such as educational facilities which may be less directly related to property
can affect property values.
84 The impact of a property tax on land value is frequently tested by comparing the
sales prices of various parcels with some value for the parcel that would have been expected
in the absence of a tax. Sales values become crucial to such methods of analysis, and infrequent sales make testing more difficult and the results open to more serious question.
85 See, e.g., D. NETZER, THE EcoNomcs OF THE PROPERTY TAX 35 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as NETZER]; Seligman, Introduction to The Shifting and Incidence of Taxation, in
READINGS IN THE EcoNoArics OF TAXAT ON 202 (R. Musgrave & C. Shoup eds. 1959).
86 This difficulty might be overcome by a model which studies either actual operating
expenses or relatively homogeneous communities in close proximity with differing tax rates.
However, the latter approach has been attempted and severely criticized. See note 113 intfra.
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been made of tax capitalization in agricultural properties." Each of
these suffers from methodological defects, but they appear to support
the existence of tax capitalization.
Jens Jensen in 193188 compared property taxes, land rents, and land
values for a five year period in thirteen states. Jensen's guarded conclusion was that property taxation contributed to a decline in the values of
farm properties."' A second study conducted. approximately thirty years
later by Daicoff9 examined the relationships between property taxes and
land values within a single state over a six year time period. Daicoff's
analysis failed to find an inverse relationship between taxes and land
values,"' and Netzer concluded that this should be seen as a contradiction of the underlying capitalization theory.92 However, more recent
work has demonstrated that this is neither necessary nor logically the
case. An important study conducted by F. 0. Woodard and R. W.
Brady" in 1965 looked at the relationships between property taxes and
sales values of farms in two states during a two-year period."' These
87

A fourth study was attempted but the data was insufficient to allow a conclusion to
be reached. Wicks, Little & Beck, A Note on Capitalization of Property Tax Changes, 21
NAT'L TAx 3. 263 (1968).
83
J. JENSEN, PROPET
Y TAXATON 3w THE UN=n
STATES 69-75 (1931).
89
Jensen compared the property values, rents, and taxes for agricultural lands in fifteen
counties in thirteen states for the years 1919 to 1924. He found that rents decreased, taxes
increased, and property values fell. While either the decrease in rents or the increase in
taxes would explain the decline in property values, the pre-tax percentage of rent to property value had increased while the after-tax percentage of rent to property value had remained constant. This indicated to Jensen that property value fell at a faster rate than
did rent, which he interpreted as a sign that at least part of the decrease in property value
was attributable to an increase in property taxes. Id. Because Jensen's results are presented
so guardedly, they do not deserve criticism. Two major weaknesses of the study, however,
are that it does not measure the rate of change of rent decline as an element of property
value change, which leaves untested the foundations for expectational factors, and that it
does not account for benefit capitalization, if any.
90
Diacoff, Capitalizationof the Property Tax (doctoral thesis, Univ. of Michigan, 1961)
cited in NE=ZE at 34-35.
91 It is unclear from Netzer's report whether benefit capitalization was tested for. This
might explain why Diacoff did not find tax capitalization present.
92 NsrzE at 35.
9'3 Woodard & Brady, Inductive Evidence of Tax Capitalization, 18 NAT'L TAX 3. 193
(1965).
94
Woodard & Brady tested the relationships between the sales prices, property tax
payments and values for 238 farms of varying size in Ohio and Indiana sold between January 1, 1962 and July 1, 1963. The hypothesis that property value as measured by sales
price should be equal to the present capitalized valpe of future tax payments was proven
to be correct by the authors' study. Woodard & Brady realized that the best statistical
evidence of tax capitalization would come from studying a sufficiently large sample of
properties in which a sale, tax change and resale would take place within a short period of
time. Id. at 195. Since such a sample is unlikely ever to be found, the authors devised a
way of testing for tax capitalization with data from single sales. They used the Federal
Land Bank's appraisal values which look solely to the income producing capacity of the
farm (without regard to the property tax) to give an independent valuation of the prop-
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authors, with Jensen, concluded that capitalization had been demonstrated. They further found that the extent to which taxes were capitalized varied with the sales value of the land in question, with inexpensive properties showing undercapitalization of the tax and high valued
properties showing overcapitalization. Woodard and Brady surmised
that this variation in capitalization was due to a larger than average
degree of competition among buyers to purchase inexpensive land and
a lower than average degree of competition among buyers to purchase
the most expensive properties.9
Considered together these studies indicate that property taxes do
exert a price deflating effect on agricultural properties. While the magnitude of this impact has not been ascertained, Woodard and Brady's
conclusions suggest that the strength of the impact varies directly with
the value of the property taxes.
(b) Tax capitalization on residential lands
A number of studies have focused on owner-occupied residential
dwellings to determine whether capitalization of the property tax exists.
A 1965 study in Montana96 compared actual to expected sale values for
properties in Montana after a tax rate increase. This analysis not only
found strong evidence of an inverse relationship between property taxes
and property values, but also found that the difference between actual
and expected values increased as the size of the tax increase grew. A
similar study, conducted by R. S. Smith,97 also compared actual to expected price differences for residential properties after the imposition of
a tax. This study is significant because the property tax increase in
residential properties occurred as a result of a reassessment program
which, in effect, shifted tax liability from business and commercial uses
to residential uses of land. This enabled Smith to test for property tax
capitalization unaccompanied by changes in the benefits property owners
received from the expenditure of tax revenues.9 8 Smith's analysis verified the presence of tax capitalization.
Heinberg and Oates in a 1970 study compared property tax variations among a sample of communities in the Boston area with property
erties in the data base to permit accurate comparisons between two or more properties to
be made.
95 Id. at 200.
96 See Wicks, Little & Beck, supra note 87.
97 Smith, Property Tax Capitalization in San Francisco, 23 NAT'L TAX J. 177 (1970).
98 Smith used an expected price-actual price methodology similar to that employed by
Wicks, supra note 85, to study the effects of a reassessment program in San Francisco. The
result of the higher residential property taxes was lower taxes on business property rather
than increased expenditures benefiting property owners. Smith, supra note 95, at 179. This
gives assurance that the results are not biased by the exclusion of benefit capitalization effects.
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value variations, and concluded that tax capitalization was present and
reflected in property value variations among jurisdictions."'
The Montana study, and Smith's study of the San Francisco situation, in addition to exploring the presence and direction of tax capitalization effects, attempted to explore the magnitude of such effects, and got
fairly similar results."° In Montana, for the properties studied, each dollar in tax revenue exacted from a property owned led to a nineteen dollar
decrease in the present value of the property. ' The authors felt that
this ratio was high, but Smith's results are comparable. Smith concluded that for the properties studied each tax dollar exacted accounted
for a fourteen to twenty dollar reduction in property values."°2
Two additional studies, which focused both on property tax capitalization and benefit capitalization, also document the presence of tax
capitalization. An earlier study by Oates' °3 compared property values
in a number of New Jersey communities with varying property tax
rates,104 and concluded that a significant inverse relationship between
property values and property tax rates was demonstrated. The most
recent work in this area, by Sabella in 1974, examined the relation99 Heinberg & Oates, The Incidence of Differential Property Taxes on RentaJ Housing:
A Comment and Some Further Evidence, 23 NAT'L TAX J. 92 (1970). Property values, property tax payments, local expenditures as represented by per pupil educational expenditures
and several other variables for residential properties in 23 communities in the Boston area
were examined. The authors made the assumption that to the extent residential properties
could be classified as equally desirable, differences in property values would reflect such
local public fiscal variables as differences in taxation of property and differences in local

spending. Their results indicated that as tax differences among communities increased, so
did sales values of properties. This analysis is basically sound. Although the attempt to
equate residences in different communities is questionable, Heinberg & Oates attempted to
account for variations in the quality of housing between communities by including a variable which represented the average age and number of rooms per dwelling, but there is
simply no way to know whether less tangible factors, such as prestige values, were taken
into account.
100 Ile range of variation in Smith's results was approximately 30 percent, Smith, supra
note 97, at 185, which would seem acceptable in light of Woodard & Brady's conclusion
regarding differences in the intensity of capitalization among price levels of properties
studied. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
101

Wicks, Little & Beck, supra note 87, at 265.

102 Smith, supra note 97, at 190.
1 3
1 Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes

and Local Public Spending on Property Values:

An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalizationand the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. oF Po. ECON.

957 (1969).
' 4 0ates studied a sample of 53 residential communities in northeastern New Jersey
in 1959-60 to compare the effects of both property taxes and public expenditures on property values. Oates attempted to account for such intangible features as physical charm,
beauty and attractiveness of the neighborhood by adding as a variable the median family
income for each community. Further, as a measure of tax rates Oates used a term he
called the effective tax rate, which was defined as the nominal tax rate times the average
assessment-to-sales price ratio, which should have removed variations in assessment practices between communities.
"I Sabella, The Effect of Property Taxes and Local Public Expenditures on Sales Prices

of Residential Dwellings, THE APPrssA

JoURNAL,

Jan. 1974, at 114.
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ships between property taxes and values for homes sold twice within a
four year period in Hennepin County, Minnesota. Sabella also concluded
that capitalization was documented.' 6
These five studies strongly indicate that owner-occupied residential
property values will be depressed by the imposition of or increase in a
property tax. Although some attempt has been made to show the strength
of this relationship, this aspect of property tax capitalization needs to
be further studied.
(c) Tax capitalization in the business and commercial
land use context
There is a paucity of studies focusing directly on the impact of
property taxes on the property values of business uses of land.' 7 Nothing in the agriculture or residential studies, however, suggests that tax
capitalization does not occur in a similar manner on business properties,
depressing land value for those portions of the property tax which cannot be shifted. One further comment can be made. Woodard and Brady
concluded that the effect of competition for property may impact on
the degree of tax capitalization that occurs. 08 To the extent that competition for business property is only of low or moderate intensity, tax
capitalization may be fairly complete for that portion of the property
tax which the land user bears.
3. Tax Shifting
When tax shifting occurs between the owner of taxed property and
the user of the property, as may occur, for example, in the context of
rental housing, the tax makes the use of the land more expensive to the
user, and makes continued use of the property less desirable than it
would be before the tax shifting took place. At the same time, the tax
shifting will offset the tax capitalization process because it will reduce
the size of the tax cost which would otherwise be capitalized into the
value of the taxed land. When property tax shifting occurs between an
owner or user (such as a firm) and another party (such as a consumer),
it should mitigate or cancel the unwanted impacts of the property tax,
for an owner will have less tax to capitalize'and a user who has had
taxes shifted to him will be able to recoup his increased rental cost.
106 There were 1,308 dwellings in the study, which sold twice between 1962-66. Sabella
compared sales values, property tax payments, and local public expenditures as measured
by school expenditures per pupil. He compared property tax changes over time and local
expenditures over time with changes in property values, and concluded that both tax and
benefit capitalization were demonstrated.
107 Wicks, Little & Beck, supra note 87, attempted to study capitalization on commercial
properties but did not have sufficient data to conduct an analysis.
1*8 Woodard & Brady, supra note 93, at 201.
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(a) Tax shifting in the agricultural land use context
Whether or not tax shifting takes place in the agricultural land
use context has not been documented. On a theoretical level, classical
tax incidence theory would seem to indicate little, if any, shifting of
property taxes on agricultural land. If the property tax cannot be
shifted, and if farmers are in a financial situation that makes it difficult
for them to come up with the cash to pay rising property taxes, the conversion of agricultural lands to other uses might be quickened.
Classical tax incidence theory holds that in many situations taxes
on the land component of property will be borne by the land owner,
while taxes on the improvements on the property will be borne by the
user of the property.'"9 The tax on the land is keyed to value which is
affected by many factors beyond the farmer's control. Property taxes on
improvements, however, may be shiftable because the farmer can destroy or discontinue their use to avoid taxation. Thus, for improvements on land, owners may choose to reduce their output (by decreasing
the use of a taxed item of production) and thus shift the tax cost to
consumers by allowing the price of the item whose production was cut
to increase to ration the restricted supply. Since agriculture relies primarily on land as the basis for production, not improvements, shifting
in this context may not occur. Those who advocate preferential tax
treatment for agricultural lands would seem by their request for special
tax treatment to be assuming that shifting of taxes does not occur.
(b) Residential land uses
There seems to be general belief that the shifting of property taxes
occurs in the residential context between land owners and land users
(renters), who are said to be the final consumers of the taxed good. 0
However, very little empirical work exists to verify this. Orr'. attempted to test for residential property tax shifting by comparing property tax differentials with rental variation for similar housing among a
sample of communities in the Boston area. He concluded that tax differentials were unrelated to rent differentials and that shifting was not
See generally sources cited at note 85 supra," This is due to the belief that owners
can be forced to bear the tax on the land itself because they cannot reduce or avoid the
tax by0 curtailing or changing the use of the land.
11 While other persons, such as the owners of building maintenance services, can be
affected by decreases in property upkeep supplied by the owners of property which becomes
subject to a tax or a tax increase, the primary effect is tax shifting to the users of taxed
property, who pay a constant amount for a smaller package of housing and maintenance
after the imposition of a tax.
"IOrr, The Incidence of Differential Property Taxes on Urban Housing, 21 NATL TAx
'.253 (1968).
109
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demonstrated.' 2 Orr's study, however, has received such severe criticism that one must be suspicious of its results.'
The question of whether the part of the property tax that relates
to the land rather than the improvements is ever shifted in the residential context is a most difficult one. Orr's focus was on improvements.
Absent studies on the point, theory would indicate that taxes on the
value of the land are borne by the property owner. Some current theorists go even further and suggest that both taxes on the value of land
and improvements will be borne by property owners."' Given the pervasiveness of lay assumptions, however, that landlords will always increase rents to cover changes in property taxation, this area needs fur112 Orr attempted to ascertain whether taxes on improvements were shifted by studying
the relationships between interjurisdictional tax differentials and rents. Orr assumed that
there was no way to determine whether components of the several property taxes studied
that were identical were shifted because there was no available indication of what rents
would have been in their absence. Rather, he hoped to learn whether shifting occurred by
assuming that if the tax differentials could account for rent differentials (if any), then shifting occurred for the components of the tax rates studied that were identical also.
Orr examined 31 communities in the Boston area for 1959. Tax rates on single family
homes ranged from 2.1 percent to 6.6 percent. Orr used the median gross rent per room
in each taxing jurisdiction as the indicator of rent differentials, computed from the median
gross rent per unit and the median number of rooms in both rental and owner occupied units.
Orr attempted to account for community differences by incorporating differences in
land value, differences in distance from the downtown business area, differences in the age
and percentage of dilapidation of the housing stock in each community, and differences in
public spending per pupil on education in order to isolate property tax effects.
Orr found that variables other than property taxes accounted for the bulk of rent
differentials, when they existed, and that tax differentials were not a significant aid in predicting rent differences. Not surprisingly, the strongest factor in rent differentials was distance from the central business district. Orr surmised, from these results, that taxes are
not shifted. Id.
"
Orr's work was first criticized by Heinberg & Oates, supra note 99, who argued that
Orr had incorrectly chosen his variables because he had not confined his data to multiple
dwelling units. Instead he had used data on single family residences, which Heinberg &
Oates felt were atypical of rentals. As a consequence, tax payments were understated, and
their effects on rents biased. Another criticism, Coen & Powell, Theory and Measurement
of the Incidence of Differential Property Taxes on Rental Housing, 25 NAT'L TAX J. 211
(1972), questions the underlying assumption of Orr's analysis. Coen & Powell argue that
tax differentials may not be accompanied by like rent differentials while shifting still occurs.
As an example, they suggest the following. Suppose that there are two neighboring tax
jurisdictions, A and B, with equal property taxes and rents. jurisdiction A raises property
taxes, and landlords within A attempt to raise rents to shift the tax. As renters in A migrate
to B to avoid the shifted tax, rents will be bid up in B until the rents in B equal the rents
in A and the incentive to migrate disappears. An observer, such as Orr, would then conclude that taxes are not shifted since rents do not differ, and would miss both the tax
shifting in A and the windfall to the landlords in B. A third criticism of Orr's work, again
by Heinberg & Oates, The Incidence of Differential Property Taxation on Rental Housing,
25 NAT'L TAX 3. 221 (1972), suggests that the relationships between the timing of tax
changes and rent changes need to be studied to remedy the Coen-Powell criticism and to
account for rent changes produced by long run trends such as inflation and growth in
demand.
'14 See, e.g., Gaffney, The Property Tax is a Progressive Tax, in PaOCEEDnGs OF THE

NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION 408-27

(1971).
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ther research before any definitive conclusion about residential property tax shifting can be made.
(c) Business and commercial land uses
Here again there are no relevant empirical studies to buttress or
refute what theoreticians have asserted regarding shifting. Shifting may
take place between users of taxed business or commercial property.
Shifting by property owners will act as an offset to tax capitalization,
and shifts to users will result in increased costs of operation. Further,
shifting may occur from users of taxed property, whether owners or
renters, and the consuming public. The empirical studies that do exist on
tax shifting by business and industries focus on income or profit taxes,
not property taxes. Most of these indicate that nearly complete shifting
of such taxes occurs." 5 In the absence of some reason to believe that
property taxes are treated by business and commercial land users like
other taxes, little can be said about the extent of tax shifting, if any, in
the commercial and industrial land use context.
4. Benefit Capitalization as an Offset to the Property Tax
So far we have examined the way in which the property tax can
reduce land value and make a particular parcel (or use of the parcel)
less desirable than it would be if the tax was lower or non-existent.
Here we will consider what effects the spending of the revenue raised
by the tax can have on land value of land owners. The value of the
tax-financed services may be reflected in an increase in property values
through capitalization of the benefits provided. In the case of land
users who have had their rental expense increased by tax shifting,
this offset will be manifested by the presence of goods or services which
would not have been present in the absence of a tax.
Benefit capitalization has been studied only in the residential context. Generally, it appears that the level of provision of public services
is positively related to property values.
Two good empirical studies have tested for benefit capitalizations
in the residential setting. The first, conducted by Oates in 1961,"6
compared variations in property tax rates with one form of local
expenditure, per pupil expenditure for education, among a sample of
jurisdictions in New Jersey. After demonstrating that the taxes were
capitalized, Oates concluded that local expenditures are positively
I I s See Meszkowski, Tax Incidence Theory: The Effects of Taxes on the Distribution
of Income,
7 J. or EcoN. LT. 1103 (1969).
6
1, See Oates, supra note 103.
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related to property values. Sabella's recent study" ' examined the
relationships between property taxes, local spending as represented per
pupil school expenditure, and property values for a sample of residences
which sold twice during a four year period in Minnesota. He also
concluded that benefit capitalization will act as an offset to the valuedepressing effect of a property tax.
Both Oates and Sabella reach a further conclusion of some interest. Beyond showing the presence of benefit capitalization, they
indicate benefit capitalization may fully offset or more than offset the
depressive effects of tax capitalization. Sabella's data, for example, was
structured into ten different time subsets for the four year period
studied. In eight of these periods, the net effect of tax and benefit
capitalization resulted in an increase in property values." 8 A growing
body of literature concerning the determinants of industrial location
has pointed to the importance of public expenditure policies, which
implies the notion of benefit capitalization. One study noted: "If a community has better schools, highways, utilities and fire and police protection, industry will be willing, even glad to pay higher taxes. Industry
wants fair taxes, not simply low ones."" 9
5. The Net Effect of the Property Tax
The preceding sections have reviewed empirical studies undertaken by economists to determine the influence that the property tax
will have on land value. It is fair to conclude from them that the tax
will effect the value of a parcel subject to the tax. Further, within a
taxing area the net impact will depend no less on the benefits financed
by the property tax than on the burdens imposed by it. If the strength
of tax capitalization is greater than the strength of benefit capitalizaIf, on the other hand, benefit
tion, then property values will decline.'
117See Sabella, supra note 105.
8

Id. at 119.
1 Murphy & Baldwin, Business Moves to the Industrial Park, 37 HAav. Bus. RLV. 79
(May/June 1959). This conclusion is supported by an ACIR study of the relationship of
taxes and industrial locational decisions: "The basis for industry's growing concern over
public expenditure policies is no longer simply a matter of the larger tax bills it pays as
State and local expenditures grow .... It stems rather from the increasing importance industry attaches to the provision of typical State and local social or people-related services,
particularly education, because the services can affect industry's ability to attract and main1
9

tain highly qualified employees."

TIONS, STATE-LocAL TAXATION AND

ADvIsoRY COmmISSioN ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL

INDusTRIAL

LOCATION

72 (1967)

RELA-

[hereinafter cited as

ACIR 1967].
12OThis can occur if taxes are increased while benefits are not. If taxes are increased
to finance higher costs of providing existing services, the decline in value should occur unless the market simultaneously recognizes the higher cost of providing these services.
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capitalization is greater than tax capitalization, property values will
rise. This may occur as a result of a reassessment program which
lowers some owners' tax bills, or when levels of service provision leads
to economies of scale, but Oates"'" and Sabella's"' findings indicate
that this will often occur when the owner of property is perceived as
the beneficiary of tax-financed services which exceed in value the
amount of the tax. One factor that will obviously bear upon the
amount of benefit capitalization is how specifically the service paid for by
the tax benefits the owner qua owner.' 3 Control over the budget is one
way a local government has of influencing land values in its jurisdiction.
It is difficult to translate the property tax's influence on land values
into land use impacts. Lower value might encourage land consumption
for residential use by permitting demanders of land to get more of it for
the same amount of money, and by slightly reducing buying costs (such
as a downpayment). Higher land value, on the other hand, may promote leapfrogging and sprawl development by forcing those with limited
resources to seek housing farther from the urban center where they
can get "more house for the money". The answer to this apparent
contradiction, of course, is that the property tax cannot be the vehicle
for resolving all the land use problems a community might face. The
studies reported here, however, do imply that the property tax does
have some impact on land development patterns. This suggests the
need for further emirical investigation addressing the broad land use
effects of the property tax as a first step in harnessing taxation for land
use planning purposes.
The importance of property tax and benefit capitalization in the
land use process is heightened because of interjurisdictional differences
in tax bills and benefit levels. This is especially so when the jurisdictions
are part of the same metropolitan area and may be viewed as interchangeable on many grounds by land consumers. The assumption here is
that those making land use decisions consider a wider geographical
area than a single taxing jurisdiction, and that within that wider greographical area tax and benefit variations will be large enough to not
leave those making land use decisions indifferent.
This view was first postulated for residential land uses by Tiebout." 4 Two subsequent studies seem to support Tiebout's conclusion
121 See Oates, supra note 103.
122 See Sabella, supra note 105.
123 See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
124 Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. oF POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
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that interjurisdictional differences affect location. The first study, by
W. J. Beeman, 25 examined the relationships between property taxation,
a number of other variables (including density, land surface characteristics, and distance from downtown metropolitan centers), and growth
in property values for taxing jurisdictions in the Syracuse, New York,
area from 1955 to 1965. Beeman concluded that property taxation did
play a role in the location of residential land use. 26 Oates' study"2 "
compared property tax and service variations with property value variations in 53 communities in northeastern New Jersey. Oates concluded
that tax and benefit capitalization were documented and that this demonstrated the validity of the locational incentive theory because "people
do appear willing to pay more to live in a community which provides
a
1 2
high-quality program of public services . .. with lower tax rates.'"
Interjurisdictional variations may also exert some influence on the
location of agricultural uses, inducing them to locate in primarily lowtax rural rather than high-tax urban areas. This may be because of
greater demand for non-property related services in urban rather than
rural areas and because of the lack of benefits agricultural and open
space uses derive from non-property related services."2 9
Commercial and industrial land uses also appear to be affected
by interjurisdictional property tax and expenditure variations. The
strength of these effects is not generally understood, however, because
studies which have examined taxes as locational incentives have focused
on all taxes faced by firms in a given area, not just the property tax. 130
5

12 W.

J. BEEMAN, THE PROPERTY TAX

URBAN AREAS,
12 6

(ULI Res.

Mono. no. 16)

AND THE SPATIAL PATTERN

OF

GROWTH WITHIN

(1969).

Beeman hypothesized that growth in total property values within a tax-imposing

jurisdiction would be a function of that jurisdiction's property taxation practices and of
its desirability in other ways, such as population density and proximity to downtown
Syracuse.
While Beeman concluded that property taxation did play a role in property value
changes, he found that population density, land surface characteristics, and location with
respect to central city were more important determinants.
127 Oates, supra note 103.
2
Id. at 968.
129 One commentator has noted:
There are important differences between rural and urban areas in the nature and
complexity of local government. In general, per capita local government expenditure is greater in urban than in rural areas due to the greater diversity of services
provided in urban areas and the greater costs of administration, public assistance,
fire and police protection and subsidized public transportation in urban areas.
G. Gustafson, The California Land Conservation Act of 1965: An Economic Analysis of a
New Tool of Land Use Policy 26 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Univ. of Calif. at
Berkeley, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Gustafson].
130 See notes 188-210 infra and text accompanying.
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However, a theory has been developed by J. D. Strasma that locational
decision-making is a multi-step process in which property tax variations
do influence location.' Strasma's thesis is that business and industrial
land uses will begin a location search by selecting regions, which are
usually multi-state geographical areas. The second step in such a location process is for the selection of some smaller area to be chosen,
usually on the basis of access to labor, materials, and so on. Finally,
within the area under consideration, a site must be selected. It is in
this final process that interjurisdictional property tax variations become
important. The Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations
concurs:
Within a State and more particularly within a metropolitan area significant local property tax rate variations can and do become swing
factors in plant location decisions-the industrial tax haven being the
most conspicuous example. In sharp contrast to States, local governments are primarily dependent on one source of revenue-the local
property tax.... Thus, the job and tax base stakes can become quite
high and interlocal competition can become quite keen. 3
6. The Role of Property Taxation in the Problems of Blight and Spread
Fully appreciating the impacts of property taxation on land use
requires considering two problems which the tax is frequently alleged
to cause-blight, and scattered or sprawl development. It has been
argued for some time that property taxation leads to blight.'3 3 Henry
George argued that blight is caused by the taxation of structures as
well as land which encourages owners to forego maintenance and rehabilitation of structures as a means of avoiding some portion of their
property tax bills.'34 If the tax does not directly cause the blight, it
might be argued that assessment practices systematically lead to the overassessment of properties in need of rehabilitation, which drains resources that might be used for maintenance and discourages investors
or owner-occupants from making needed repairs and improvements. 3
However, assessment practices do not seem to play a part in the
blighting of an area. Ordinary maintenance does not add to tax bills.
Further, most improvements to structures do not lead to reassessment.
Peterson's study found that few improvements of moderate scale
131 J.D. STRASMA, STATE AND LoCAL TAXATION OF INDUSTRY (1959).
132 ACIR 1967 at 70. See also Due, Studies of State-Local Tax Influences on Location
of Industry, 14 NAT's. TAX J. 163 (1961).
133 See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 648-50.
134 H.

GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERT

(1911).

135 Cf. Note, Reducing Property Taxes: An Evaluation of Collective Action, 51 LAND
ECONOMICS 94 (1975).
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($10,000 or less) led to reassessment and a larger tax bill."3 6 Further,
reassessment when it does occur typically does not increase the valuation
of a property by the full cost of the rehabilitation work.""7 Reassessments of more substantial improvements may not even be a significant
factor in the creation of blight:
As to more sizable outlays, the expense is desirable or not desirable,
justifiable or not justifiable on non-tax grounds. If he (a property
owner) fails to make major improvements, it is because the return
would not justify the investment, on the assumption that these gentlemen are concerned above all about profits. That is, even though
the absolute size of his tax bill would rise, yet, as a proportion of the
increased rental income, they would remain the same, assuming that
a comparable market for higher priced rentals exists. Hence, it is
simply market conditions, not tax policy, that make the investment
unprofitable.' 3 8
Taxes are a relevant factor because they would be an additional cost,
but the question whether rehabilitation investment will pay for itself
will probably be of greater significance because of the relative costs
differentials between the improvements and the tax." 9
Secondly, a "tax on land only" form of assessment may also create
blight. There are no pure "land only" property tax systems in the
United States, but two cities have a graded tax system which taxes land
more heavily than improvements.
Pittsburgh has employed a graded tax since 1913.4 ° Since 1925,
land has been taxed at twice the rate of improvements. 4 ' Studies
examining Pittsburgh's graded tax have come up with little evidence
that the graded tax has stimulated property improvements.'4 2 This
may be due to the fact that only one of three taxing jurisdictions has
the graded tax. Further, the more recent study found that
[t]he graded tax system apparently did not prevent blight from affecting many areas of the city. In addition, since most of those surveyed
136 PROPERTY
37

TAXES, HOUSING at 29.

1

Id. at 6.

138

Curran, The General Property Tax and Residential Rehabilitation, PaocEEDINGs OP

THE NATIONAL TAx ASSOCIATION 250, 254-55 (1964).

But see Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 649-50.
Richman, The Theory and Practice o1 Site-Value Taxation in Pittsburgh, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL TAx ASSOCIATION 259 (1964).
141 PRICE WATERHOUSE & Co., A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF REAL PROPERTY TAX INCENTIVE PROGRAMS UPON PROPERTY REHABILITATION AND NEW CONSTRUCTION 3 (1973). The
city, county and school district all tax Pittsburgh property. Only the city has the graded
tax. Walker, Some Observations on Land Value Taxation, THE APPRAISAL JOURNAL, Jan.
1973, at 96.
142 Richman, supra note 140 and PRICE WATERHOUSE & Co., supra note 141.
139
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in Pittsburgh either did not know the graded tax existed or did not
understand it, there has to he considerable doubt that it functions asan incentive in Pittsburgh. 4' 3
Honolulu has a graded tax of more recent origin than the Pittsburgh system. The high ratio of land to improvements values, and the
high cost of development in Honolulu, may work against the tax having
a significant impact on land use patterns. A major study of Honolulu's
experience to date with its tax has concluded that there is little if any
discernible incentive in Honolulu's graded tax program to redevelop
blighted areas. '
Concerning the role the property tax plays in the creation of
blight, it can be fairly concluded from the information presented here
that it is not the tax itself or whether the tax is on improvements as
well as land that contributes to blight as much as the administration
of assessment programs. This was a major conclusion of a 1973 HUD
sponsored study of blighted property :4'
A clear pattern emerges in which poor-quality housing in blighted
neighborhoods, occupied by low income tenants, pay property taxes
at a substantially higher rate than property in other neighborhoods.
Since the millage rate is uniform throughout each city, neighborhood
differences in effective tax rates are due entirely to differential assessment/market value rations. 4' 6
Infrequent reassessment may be the cause of the overassessment of
deteriorating and blighted neighborhoods. This means changes in the
neighborhood characteristics and property values will not be reflected
in property taxes. As a result both overevaluation of declining neighborhoods and underevaluation of upward transitional neighborhoods occurs. 4 ' One alternative explanation has been suggested: that assessors
may take into account the greater amount of services that must be
provided to areas with a high population density per dollar of property
value and assess such areas higher than other parts of the tax jurisdic14
144

PRICE WATERHOUSE & Co., supra note 141, at 3.
Id. See also Hulton, Hawaii's Modified Property Tax Base Law, in

THE NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION 52
14 5

ARTHUa

PROCEEDiNGS OF

(1969).

D. LrrTE, INc., A STUDY OP PROPERTY TAXES AND URBAN BLIGHT, SEN.

Comm. ON GOV'T. OPERATIONS, SuBCOMIX. ON INTERGOV'TAL RELATIONS, 93d CONG., IsT SESS.

(Comm. Print 1973). This study of ten major urban areas was the research on which
PROPERTY TAXES, Houssua, supra note 21, was based. An analysis was undertaken of the
relative property tax burden in each of those areas for different economic levels of housing.
As a measure of tax burden, the ratio of actual market value to assessed value for each
class of housing was used.
'46ARTHuR D. L
LE, INC., supra note 149, at 10.
147PROPERTY TAxEs, HOUSING at 6, 19-26.
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tion." ' It should be noted, however, that inaccurate assessment is not
inherent in a property tax system." 9
A second way in which property taxation is thought to have contributed to the present land use crisis is as an inducement to sprawl or
scatter development. The taxation of improvements as well as land,
assessment of property at its current fair value rather than its highest
-and best use, and interjurisdictional tax variations are pointed to as
the causal elements.
Taxing improvements creates an incentive for sprawl, some assert,
by discouraging intense use of land and encouraging horizontal spreading
out and increased lot coverage and use of land.'50 The property tax on a
building is like an increased cost and will deter building. Spreading out
.development results, to a degree, in capital cost savings, when compared
with building up a smaller parcel. So, although property taxes reduce
the intensity of use of a parcel, they will induce land consumption. '
It is currently unknown how significant a factor the property tax on
improvements is in the process by which metropolitan areas sprawl.
It may be that consumers strongly prefer low density type developments
and are willing to suffer the commuting and other expenses that must
be incurred to get such housing which may be forced out to or beyond
the existing fringe of development by the general demand for land.
Consumers' perceptions of the tax and benefit mix which can be involved in locational decisions, as the capitalization studies show,"5 2 may
also play a role here. At any rate, it is not clear that relying on a land
tax only is a viable alternative. The experience with site value taxation
'
in Australia and New Zealand has shown that sprawl may still occur, 53
8

Oldman & Aaron, Assessment-Sales Ratios Under the Boston Property Tax, 18 NAT'L
TAX J. 36, 43 (1965).
149 The HUD-sponsored study done by Arthur D. Little, Inc. found several
of the ten
cities studied had very similar median effective property tax rates among different neighborhoods. For instance, in San Francisco, blighted property has a median effective rate of 1.9
percent, downward transitional property 2.5 percent, upward transitional 2.0 percent and
stable neighborhoods 2.2 percent. Baltimore, on the other hand was not so consistent. Its
rates for the same categories of neighborhoods were 14.9 percent, 9.8 percent, 1.4 percent
and 1.6 percent respectively. PROPERTY TAXES, HOUSING at 10, Table A. Further, the Montana study of property tax capitalization found no significant variation in assessment-sales
ratio with respect to property value, age or location. Wicks, Little & Beck, supra note 87,
at 264.
150 Gaffney, Tax Reform to Release Land, in MODERNIZING URBAN LAND POLICY 130-31
(M. Clawson ed. 1973).
id.
I'
152 See notes 116-19 supra and text accompanying.
153 See Lefcoe, Tax and Urban Design Policy, supra note 10. Lefcoe reports that
in Sydney low density housing can be built in areas far from the center city where
land is a bargain and the tax rate reflects that bargain. Also, in that metropolitan area,
many of the suburbs have voted against the site value tax.
14
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and that the tax may have unwanted harsh effects on certain land users,
particularly low-income homeowners living in or near the central city.""
Secondly, the administration of the property tax arguably leads
to (or acquiesces in the face of) sprawl by assessing land at its current
fair market value rather than at its highest and best use. The consequence
of this may be that inefficient uses of land are tolerated and new, more
efficient uses are forced to spread out into areas that have not been
developed. If this means that the property could be used as a means
of pricing out certain inefficient land uses by making their costs prohibitive, then it may be that the current form of assessment allows
sprawl. Private land users can choose to buy out current inefficient
users in urban areas. That they have not done so indicates that the urbansuburban land price differential is a powerful incentive to the creation
of sprawl. A tax on land only or a strongly graded tax might force
current inefficient land users out. This would probably depend on
whether the tax will put inefficient users in a position where they do
not have the cash to meet the tax payments. Otherwise, since land costs
would remain the same because of increased taxes, no change would be
made in the urban-suburban price differential, and the same sprawl incentive would remain. The Australian experience has been that the site
value tax has helped the turnover of land uses in high demand center
city areas:
The most important role of the site value tax system in the ... redevelopment process appears to be in increasing the availability and
the early use of redevelopment sites in the area of increased demand.
It increases the availability of sites by accelerating the transition of
properties to the status of economic redevelopment sites and then
positively encouraging their sale for redevelopment.' 55
Finally, property taxation may influence urban sprawl through the
influence of locational incentives created by interjurisdictional tax differ,54 Woodruff, Land Value Taxation: A 1966 Evaluation, in THE PRoP.RTY TAX: PaoBLzrs
POTENT.S (Tax Institute of America 1967). Woodruff reports:
In the older parts of almost every city elderly pensioners of limited means found
it difficult to retain their homes in neighborhoods where land values were rising
as commercial and industrial uses began to supersede single residences. These 'holdouts' were non-economic underusers in the classic sense, but their strong emotional
ties to their residences were a political factor too important to ignore and the 'hardship' exemptions were enacted to enable such owners to stay put.
Id. at 435. In Hawaii special legislation was enacted to relieve pressure on taxpayers living
in older homes and those less financially able to make substantial improvements in their
property under Hawaii's graded tax system. Hulton, Hawaii's Modified Property Tax Base
Law, in PROCEEDiNGS op THE NATIONAL TAX AssociATioN at 62 (1969).
,55 R.W. ARCHER, SIra VALueS TAXATIoN IN CENTRAL BussNss DisTRacr REi)EvELoPENT 17 (ULI Res. Rpt. no. 19) (1972).
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entials. The Oates'" and Sabella" 7 studies demonstrate that land users,
at least residential land users, react to interjurisdictional incentives.
While there may not be sprawl-inducing differentials in metropolitan
areas in the sense that central city areas can be characterized as high-tax
' there
areas while suburban areas can be characterized as low-tax areas, 58
are benefit differentials that can work a like effect. This is especially
true for welfare expenditures, which are highly concentrated in nonsuburban areas. This gives central city property owners who normally
do not directly receive these benefits an incentive to move to possibly
more tax expensive jurisdictions in which they will be the more direct
beneficiaries of the services their tax dollars provide.
B. Sales Tax
The sales tax will influence land use by changing the income available to be spent on all purchases, including those related to land, and
by creating a set of interjurisdictional price incentives which will influence general sales and business activity levels and thus shape land use
decisions. Further, the capitalization of benefits financed by sales and
gross receipts tax revenues may affect property values. Sales taxation
as a revenue source for state and local governments is second only in
importance to property taxation."5 9 All states tax selective items such
as motor fuels, alcohol, and tobacco, and 45 states levy general sales
and gross receipts taxes. 60 In the aggregate, such taxes raised approximately 33 billion dollars for state and local governments in 1971.1
To date, the study of land use impacts of the sales tax has been
ignored despite the likelihood that there are some impacts. Any analysis
of such impacts, if any, may be based, at least in part, on speculation.
If land users can shift these taxes (as commercial users might be able
to do to their customers) it will be most difficult to even speculate about
the effect of sales taxation on particular land uses. Focusing on residential land use, it is doubtful whether the tax, considered by itself,
156

See Oates, supra note 103.

157 See Sabella, supra note 105.
158 On the question of whether urban and suburban areas can be characterized as taxexpensive and tax-inexpensive, respectively, compare Note, The Property Tax-A Withering
Vine, 60 Ky. L.J. 174, 187-89 (1971) with Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance
Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303, 1328-29 (1972).
159 1973 STAT. ABsTRA T at 411, figure 28. For a breakdown on a state-by-state basis
of the percentage of general revenue raised by sales and gross receipts taxes see ACIR
1973-74 at 38, table 25.
160 See notes 44-46 supra.
161 1973 STAT. ABSTRACT at 419, table 668. The sales tax burden as a percentage of
income was mildly regressive in 1970 at least in the urban centers. See ACIR 1972 at 62-63,
table 39.
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has a substantial effect on the timing, location, or style of residential
development. The tax usually represents no more than two percent of
family income and does not vary too much among income groups.' 2
Translated into monthly figures, the sales tax would not represent a
large percentage of a family's housing expenses. If the tax were
eliminated and not replaced by another tax, the amount of money that
each family would have, even if all of it were spent on housing, would
probably not put it in a position to demand much different housing
than it already has. This may be an even more certain result at the lower
end of the income spectrum.
A more interesting exercise is to consider the effects on residential
land uses of dropping the sales tax and replacing it with an increased
property tax. This should indicate the opportunity costs which are
borne by residential land users. It is hard to know exactly how much
the property tax rate would have to be increased if state and local
governments chose to finance expenditures by greater property taxes
rather than imposing sales taxes, but based on 1971 figures total property
tax receipts would have had to rise over 40 percent to generate the
revenue produced by the general sales tax.'63 The use of sales taxes
most likely maintains property values at a higher level than if revenue
needs were financed by property tax increases. Everyone, not just landowners, pays sales taxes, and it is less likely that such taxes will be
capitalized into property values than will be property taxes. Consequently, the demand for residential land would probably be higher than
under a property tax scheme, if only marginally. For agricultural and
open space land uses the income reducing aspect of sales taxation has
also probably had a negligible effect. Assuming again, however, that
sales taxes are imposed as a substitute for property tax increases, then
the use of sales taxation may prevent increased tax costs to open space
and agricultural land users. This may slow down a little the conversion
of such land to other uses.
The income reducing effect of sales taxation on commercial and
industrial land use is likely to be of small consequence if commonly
held beliefs about the extent of shifting of such taxes in this context
are accurate. Mieszkowski reports after a review of empirical studies
on tax shifting that sales and gross receipts taxes are almost fully
162 See ACIR 1973-74 at 55, table 40; ACIR 1972 at 62-63, table 39.
163 In 1971 the state-local property tax contributed 39.9 percent to total state and

local tax receipts and the general sales tax contributed 16.4 percent. 1973

STAT. ABsTRAcT

at 411, table 28. The 40 percent figure given in the text results from figuring what percentage of the property tax figures the sales tax figure is.
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shifted. 6 " While some small percentage of sales taxes will be borne
by these land users, and while the shifting of such taxes may mean
some loss in income because of sales declines, it would still seem that
sales and gross receipts taxes do not decrease incomes enough to alter
land use demands. It may be the case, however, that interjurisdictional
price differentials will have a strong income reducing effect for local
or small market area businesses which will impact on land use.
Sales taxes can also impact on land use by creating interjurisdictional price differentials which create incentives effecting the level
of business and sales activity.'65 Such incentives can affect the spatial
distribution of business activity, and thus the demand for land uses
interjurisdictionally. A corresponding effect on income may strongly
influence the behavior of business land users with geographically small
markets.
The imposition of a sales tax will create price differentials between
the tax-imposing jurisdiction and non-tax-imposing jurisdictions which
can cause sales activity to concentrate in those jurisdictions without a
tax. This will depend on the rate of sales taxation within the taximposing jurisdictions and on the proximity of tax-imposing jurisdictions to areas which do not impose such a tax.
Several studies documenting the effects of sales taxation on business
levels and the significance of available non-tax-imposing jurisdictions
have been made. One such study compared sales tax changes between
1948-1965 in New York City and the state of Alabama. 6 6 New York
City was chosen because of the availability of non-tax jurisdictions in
close proximity, while Alabama was chosen because of the few nearby
jurisdictions which did not impose a sales tax. It was found that sales
activity was negatively influenced in New York City because of available
alternatives, while the sales tax in Alabama appeared to exert no similar
negative effect.'6 7 Another study focused on sales activity in three
border cities in the state of Washington which all had non-taxing
jurisdictions just across the state border.' 65 It concluded that:
164
165

23

See Mieszkowski, supra note 115.
See Mikesell, Central Cities and Sales Tax Differentials: The Border City Problem,

NAT'L TAX

J.

206 (1970).

166 Hamovitch, Sales Taxation: An Analysis of the Effects of Rate Increases in Two
Contrasting Cases, 19 NAT'L TAx J. 411 (1966).
167 The technique was to test for growth in sales tax revenue before and after sales
tax rate increases. As a result, it would seem that possible differences in consuming patterns
would not be responsible for the differing results. Id.
168McAllister,

The Border Tax Problem in Washington, 14 NAT'L TAx J. 362 (1961).
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In every case for the three cities of Vancouver, Walla Walla and
Pullman, the trade pattern is different from what would be expected
if the sales tax were not a factor in buying decisions. An examination
of the reasons given by buyers for purchasing in non-tax areas shows
that escaping the sales tax is a dominant reason in people's minds.
The unusual buying pattern, coupled with the fact that people overwhelmingly feel that the tax is important, make it difficult to escape
the conclusion that a desire to obtain a price advantage by not payreason why border
ing Washington's retail sales tax is one
69 important
residents will shop in non-tax states.'
A later study compared sales activity in Illinois for border and nonborder counties to test for sales volume differences which can be attributed to tax avoidance by shopping outside of the state on the part
of consumers.' 70 The results of this study also indicated that total sales
per capita and sales tax revenues per capita are adversely effected in
counties located on the border. This supports the theory that stores in
high sales tax border areas do suffer a tax-induced sales migration.""
The land use impact of these interjurisdictional incentives is uncertain. For residential land uses, it is unlikely that these incentives
strongly affect locational preferences.' 72 For business and commercial
activities, it is likely that interjurisdictional price incentives will intensify business activities in non-tax jurisdictions. This will increase the
demand for commercial land uses within the non-taxing jurisdiction
and should lower or dampen the demand for such land uses withiin tax
imposing jurisdictions; thus the spatial distribution of land uses will
likely be altered by sales taxation.
69
1 Id. at 374. McAllister used both an empirical and an interview technique. McAllister
contrasted total sales per capita between three border cities and nonborder cities to reach
his empirical results. He also employed an interview technique, which is subject to the
criticism that an incentive exists for purchasers to complain about the effects of taxes in
that such complaints will influence future sales tax change decisions.
the hopes
70
1
Mikesell, Sales Taxation and the Border County Problem, 11 Q. REv. or Ecom. AIm
Bus. 23 (1971).
171 Id. at 28. Mikesell grouped all Illinois counties into two groups, those bordering
on adjacent states and those not, and compared the effects of variables including average
county income, percentage of county residents with incomes over $10,000 per year, as well
as border proximity to lower tax areas, on per capita sales. Mikesell concluded that ability
to avoid taxes did impact on per capita sales. Specifiically, he found that border county
per capita sales would be between $23-188 lower than nonborder counties, with average per
capita7 2sales for all counties being $1,321.
1
Different types of business and commercial land uses will he affected in different
ways by sales taxation. Studying the situation in Illinois, Mikesell found that while tax
avoidance was possible, sales volume did not fall off for convenience goods and automobile
sales. For the former category of goods, Mikesell explained this result by conjecturing that
for convenience products, proximity to the buyer is an important factor in the shopping
choice. Regarding automobile sales, Mikesell noted that although sales tax savings on the
purchase of a car can be substantial, the auto must be registered and licensed in the state
of operation, which can often collect a use tax. So savings from auto purchase in a lower
sales tax state is likely to be absent. Id. at 28-29.
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Finally, the use of a sales tax may have impacts on land use
patterns if sales tax revenues are used for the provision of services
which are capitalized into property values. This has not been tested
for, but benefit capitalization has been studied and the focus there is
on the services provided, not the source of the revenue used to finance
the service.73 Therefore, there is no reason not to believe the phenomenon
will operate with sales tax-financed benefits as well as property taxfinanced ones.
C. State and Local Incomes Taxes
State and local governments 74' have increased their reliance on
income taxation as a revenue source in recent years. 75 Almost all the
'
states levy an income tax, 76
and several states have given their local
See notes 116-80 supra and text accompanying.
Because the focus of this article is on state and local taxes, no attempt is made to
discuss the influence of the federal income tax on land use. However, such an influence
exists and is surely a profound one. See generally Gurko, Federal Income Taxes and Urban
Sprawl, 48 DENVER L.J. 329 (1972). Provisions in the Internal Revenue Code allowing
interest on mortgages, property taxes and other expenses relating to a home to be deducted
from income while not providing for any of the tax benefits to be passed on to renters
and not taxing owners on the imputed rental income of their homes point up a bias in the
federal tax laws for homeownership. Further, these deductions give homeowners more resources to spend on their houses and probably encourage consumption of housing. The
progressive rate of taxation exacerbates this because it makes these deductions mean more
to higher income taxpayers. Federal tax law also encourages speculation in land by allowing deductions against income (whether derived from the property or not) for expenses
related to the purchase and development of rental property. Then investors are often allowed to report the profit they make as a capital gain which has a favorable tax rate.
This policy would seem to stimulate sales activity and development on the rural-urban
fringe and beyond, driving up prices and hastening the conversion of open space and agricultural land to suburban uses. While the tax advantages of real estate investment might
be expected to increase the supply of rental housing, the general lack of differentiation between incentives to invest in low income apartments as opposed to moderate and upper
income apartments means that the housing most needed will not be built. A real estate
tax shelter to be most effective requires ample mortgage credit for averaging, a relatively
assured income and resale value, plus some prospect for a capital gain on sale. Luxury
housing tends to meet these requirements best. If the federal tax laws favor homeownership and encourage consumption of land for single-family housing, encourage development
on the rural-urban fringe and do not encourage the provision of low-income housing, then
federal tax policy will diminish whatever land use planning benefits a local tax program
might contain. Tax reform for land use planning requires a full understanding of how
federal taxation relates to state and local planning and taxation policy.
175 As a percentage of total state and local revenue nationally, state-local individual
income taxes increased over 300 percent to 8.2 percent from 1942 to 1971. ACIR 1973-74
at 36, table 23. For a history of income taxation by state and local governments see Deran,
E ACADEmy OF PoLrrAn Overview of the Municipal Income Tax, in 28 PROCEEDINGS Op
CAL SCIENcE 441 (R. Connery ed. 1968).
176 At least Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and
Wyoming do not have a state income tax. See ACIR 1973-74 at 36, table 23. Practices
vary among the states. Connecticut, for example, does not have a personal income tax
but does tax capital gains and dividends. CCH STATE TAX GUIDE, ALL STATES 9 15--295
(1967).
173
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governments the power to levy such a tax.'"" Income taxation has an
income reduction effect, which will alter the purchasing power of the
taxpayer and can affect land use. Local income taxation can create
interjurisdictional tax liability differentials which can alter the spatial
distribution of land uses. If the revenues derived from an income tax
are used to provide services the values of which are capitalized into
property values, benefit capitalization may also occur.
The importance of local income taxation obviously varies depending
on the level of the tax, but wherever it is used it represents a significant
portion of local tax revenues.' 78 There are several forms in which the
local income tax is levied. It can be, of course, a flat rate tax on earned
income. New York City has a graduated tax.'" The taxing jurisdiction
is normally that of the taxpayer's domicile, though some cities tax
nonresident employees. 8 ' New York City taxes nonresidents at a lower
rate than residents.' 8' Where income taxation on the municipal level is
widely employed, workers who are taxed in both their home and
employment cities are given relief by state mandated income tax
liability ceilings and tax sharing plans.'82
Residential land uses can be influenced by this tax in several ways.
Empirical studies of the impact of income taxation on residential
land uses are nonexistent, but in theory certain results can be expected.
Demand for more expensive residential land uses should be depressed
by income taxation. Income taxation should reduce purchasing power,
while the expenditure of income tax revenues may be capitalized into
higher property values. This means lower incomes and greater demand
for housing with the services that have been attached to it. This may
force some consumers to switch to less expensive land uses. To the
extent that less expensive land uses are equatable with more intense
land uses, such as apartments and multi-family structures, land consumption will decline. This result is likely to grow in strength if the
form of income taxation is progressive rather than flat rate, and if
unearned income as well as earned income is included within the tax
base, largely because such forms of taxation more heavily affect the
affluent rather than those with lower incomes.
177See note 42 supra and text accompanying.
78

1 The percentage of revenue municipal tax collections represented in 1971-72 in cities
over 50,000 population ranged from 14.2 percent in Baltimore to 80.5 percent in Springfield, Ohio. The median figure was 46.0 percent. ACIR 1973-74 at 291-94, table 150. See
also, CCH STATE TAx GuIm, ALL STATES ff15-691 (1967).
'79Deran, Tax Structure in Cities Using the Income Tax, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 147 (1968).
18 0 See generally, UNrED STATES ADvisORY Coiiinix ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, T=x ComruTER AND TaE MuNrCiPAL IrcomE TAX (1970 ed.).
181 Id.
82

at 7.

1 1d.at 15.
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A second way in which income taxation can impact on residential
land use is through the creation of interjurisdictional tax liability differentials. This can occur if an income tax is applicable to residents but
not to nonresidents, and can also occur if an income tax-imposing
jurisdiction is in close proximity to a jurisdiction which does not impose income taxes. While studies focusing on this migration incentive
are lacking, the work that has been done suggests that such effects
are small. Buehler,'83 for example, in describing the experience which
Philadelphia has had with income taxation, reports that an incentive
to avoid taxation has not developed. He believes this is attributable
to the deductibility of local income taxes from federal income tax
liability, and to the level of property taxation which has prevailed,
which many feel is low due to the revenue generated by the income tax. 84
A study of the New York experience with income taxation also concluded that migration incentives are small.185
Agricultural and open space land uses can also be influenced by
income taxation. Whether such uses are benefited by higher income
taxes and lower property taxes will depend on the relative tax liability
of land owners of land in such uses, under both income and property
taxation, which can vary among taxing jurisdictions. But agricultural
land users should be better off when income taxes are substituted for
property taxes. The ratio of property taxes to personal income for
the farm and non-farm population shows that agriculture contributes a
disproportionately large share of local public revenue. In 1970 taxes
on farm property in the United States were 13.9 percent of the income
of the farm population, while taxes on non-farm property amounted
to only 4.0 percent of the income of non-farm population.18 6 If this
situation is altered by the imposition of a flat rate income tax, agricultural
land users should pay a smaller portion of local tax bills. Depending
on the profitability of individual operations, such land users might pay
a smaller portion of tax bills under a progressive rate income tax. This,
of course, will only result if property taxes are lowered (or remain
lower than they would be) when an income tax is levied. This would
appear to be the case. 8
183 Buehler, Philadelphia'sExperience, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 175, at 449.
84
1
Id. at 451.
18S White, Economic Evaluation of the Munipical Income Tax, in PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 175, at 455.
186 Gustafson, supra note 129, at 40.
187 Deran, supra note 179, at 152.
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D. Taxes, Tax Climates, and Business Uses of Land

Much of the available information about the relationship of taxes
and land use concerns residential uses of land. At this point, however,
it is appropriate to focus specifically on business uses. Commercial and
industrial land users are subject to a variety of taxes which can influence
land use decision making. The array of taxes to which businesses are
subject can reduce income available to be spent for all purchases, including land uses, and can also create interjurisdictional incentives based
on tax differentials which can alter the spatial distribution of commercial land uses. The incentives which taxation creates for business and
commercial uses of land can be important for two reasons. First, such
taxes may affect the quantity and location of business land uses. Secondly,
to the extent that residential land uses can be viewed as influenced by
the location of commercial land uses,' 88 such taxation will exert influences over a larger variety and quantity of land uses than just commercial uses.
The relationships between taxation in general and business or
commercial land uses have been frequently studied. Yet the relationships
between each of the taxes considered here and business land uses are
not well understood because most studies have lumped together all
taxes which a firm may face in a particular locale. Industrial and manufacturing land uses have received the most study, and other commercial
land uses are less clearly understood. In addition, these studies have
concentrated on the interjurisdictional price incentive effects of tax
policies rather than analyzing income reduction effects of business taxes.
This discussion will examine current opinions on tax policies related to
business uses, focusing on industrial and manufacturing firms.
One technique used to study the relationship between taxes and
business uses has been to look at the growth of some measure of business or industrial activity in various states and to compare these growth
rates with each state's relative total tax burden. The implicit assumption
of such studies is that growth rates and tax burdens should be inversely
related.
An early study compared industrial growth in Iowa with several
other states."8 9 Growth in manufacturing employment and capital outlays of manufacturers were selected as the measures of industrial
activity. Growth in tax collections was employed as the measure of tax
burden, though this was not limited to taxes on industries only. The
188 See, e.g., L. SAcALyix & G. STERNMMn,ZONING

AND HOUSING COSTS (1973).
189 Bloom, State and Local Tax Differentials (Bureau of Bus. Res., Univ. of Iowa, 1955).
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states with the higher taxes showed the greatest growth in manufacturing. The conclusion was that taxes *do not retard industrial
growth. For a number of reasons, this analysis is less than convincing.
It may indicate nothing more than the fact that states with industrial
growth received tax revenues that those without indusrial growth did
not because of lack of businesses to tax.
Thompson and Mattila employed significantly more sophisticated
analytical techniques in their analysis of 29 manufacturing industries
in several states for the period 1947-1954."9" They examined a number

of growth indicators, the most important of which they felt was growth
in manufacturing employment, and determined that there was no
significant relationship between interstate tax differentials and growth
in employment.' 9'
A third study of this type, conducted in 1967 by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 92 divided the nation into eight
regions and compared states within each region on the basis of growth
in manufacturing employment and total business tax liability in each
state. This study also
found that tax differentials did not significantly
19 3
effect growth rates.

These tax and growth studies are of limited value. They seem to
indicate that taxes and economic stagnation are not directly related, but
leave many important questions unanswered. For instance, would industrial growth have been even higher in the high growth states if taxes
had been lower? Do taxes influence the in-state selection of location or
the amount of land used? It is difficult to determine from the studies
whether it is that the taxes are not significant, or that other governmental or private stimuli have offset otherwise potentially large effects
which taxes might exert. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations felt the latter was the case:
19 0

W.R. ThompsoN & J.M. MATTiLA, AN EcoNorETRIC MODEL OF POSTWAR STATE

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH (1959).
191 Thompson & Matilla employed a model in which they used taxes paid by busi-

nesses per employee and the measure of an individual state's tax burden for the industry
in question. Growth in manufacturing employment was used as the indicator of economic
growth. One limitation of this study may be that it does not deal with the effects of property or gross receipts taxes on capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive indicator levels.
192 ACIR 1967 at 63-68.
192 The ACIR study was substantially like that employed by Thompson & Matilla.
However, the ACIR did not attempt industry-by-industry comparisons. Rather, the ACIR
assumed that growth in each state (within a given region) in total manufacturing employment would be a good indicator of economic development. Like the Thompson & Matilla
study, this study failed to indicate the impact of taxation on capital-intensive as opposed
to labor-intensive industries.
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This lack of relationship can be attributed in no small measure
to the fact that States are constantly taking steps to insure that their
taxes do not "get out of line" with those of their neighboring jurisdictions. A state usually moves into this competitive arena armed with
many tax options and sufficient political support to enable it to go a
long way toward neutralizing any tax differential advantage possessed
by a neighboring State.' 9
A second technique used to study the relationships between taxes
and business land use is the interview technique in which business leaders are questioned about the factors that have influenced their location
decisions. They usually indicate that taxes play a minor role. The availability of supplies and labor, and accessibility to markets, are generally
more significant."
One review of several surveys of firms moving out
of New York City from 1947-1955 showed that some 14 percent of
those responding to the surveys indicated that taxation was the major
reason for their move. 96 The author suggested that ". . . changes in
the structure of a firm may well change its best location from a tax viewpoint. As a firm grows in size, for example, its income may increase
more rapidly than its property needs, and, as a result, the best location
for a firm may shift."' 97
One portion of Strasma's study, mentioned earlier,' 8 used the interviev technique. Strasma polled several hundred Massachusetts' manufacturers and inquired about the effects of both state and local taxes on
their choices of location. Some 16 percent of those responding stated
that local taxes definitely influenced their decisions, while 19 percent
made the same reply for state taxes. Further, slightly higher percentages
indicated that state and local taxes would affect future expansion and
new location decisions. 99
Campbell's and Strasma's findings cannot be accepted unreservedly:
It must be kept in mind that (these studies) do not indicate the
magnitude of the tax influence in location decision making. Likewise,
the anti-tax attitude of many businessmen conditions them to stress
the tax factor, as does the belief that their answers may influence the
conclusions of the survey and thus ultimately bring lower taxes.2"'
194 ACIR 1967 at 70.
19s See, e.g., Mic im

SuRvEy RE sarAc

CEN=R, INDUSTRIL& MOBMlTY I

MIcmiGAN

(1950); Plant Site Preferences of Industry and Factors of Selection (Business Week Res.

Rep., 1958).

196 Campbell, Taxes and Industrial Location in the New York Metropolitan Region,
11 NATL
TAX J. 195 (1958).
97
1 Id. at 206.
9
' 1 See STRAsuxA, note 131 supra.
9 9
1 Id. at 14.
200 Due, Studies of State-Local Tax Influences on Location of Industry, 14 NAT'r. TAX J.
163 (1961).
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A third method employed to test the relationships between taxes
and industrial location is to analyze the role of state and local taxes as
an element of industrial cost. One approach has been to use data for
hypothetical firms, and to determine the tax burden which would exist
for such firms in various locations." ' Usually, fairly substantial differences are found among jurisdictions. Alternatively, the actual operating
data of firms with multistate plants has been used."0 2 Again, differences
in tax burden are frequently noted.
These studies may demonstrate no more than that tax differentials
exist which could act as inducements or barriers to industrial location.
Even the studies of firms with multistate operations are inconclusive because of the noncomparability of operations in various states and inadequate samples. The willingness of firms who pay high taxes to cooperate
may also bias the sample and the results of these studies." 3
Making sense of these various studies of tax effects on business
land uses is a difficult task. Strasma has had the most success to date.
Strasma posits that a firm's decision to locate a plant is a three step
process. First is the selection of a region, then the selection of communities within this region, and finally the selection of a site. A region
will be chosen from which the product market can be adequately served
and materials and skilled labor readily obtained. Communities will be
selected which appear to offer the most attractive combination of services and low costs. Finally, the most satisfactory of the available sites
in or near the selected town will be acquired.
Strasma asserts that the tax influences are present in the second
step of the selection process, rather than in the last stage, site selection,
where taxes are often thought to be determinative if two or more sites
are equal in all other considerations. Strasma believes the tax effects often
come into play in a negative way in the elimination of all locations in
the general region that are not believed to offer the most attractive environments. 4 This occurs not because firms objectively assess all communities within a region, but rather because in selecting communities
businessmen rely on "tax reputations."
201 See, e.g., 3. FLOYD, EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON INDUSTRIAL LOCATION (1951); STRAsmA,
supra note 131; Campbell, supra note 196. The Campbell study is representative. Campbell
compared both actual and hypothetical operating costs for 25 manufacturing firms in both
their present and 64 alternative sites. The impact of real and personal property taxes,
corporate income taxes, corporate franchise taxes, gross receipt taxes, and unemployment
compensation taxes on each firm was compared for each location. Clear differences werp
noted.
20 2
See, e.g., D. YN"rMA, COMMONWEALTH OF PNSYLVANIA, TAX STury CoMEMISSION, THE TAX PROBLEM (1953); MICHIGAN TAXEs ON BusINEss (19591
203 See Due, supra note 200, at 166.
204 See STRASmA, supra note 131, at 7.
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Strasma's surveys led him to conclude that a state with a bad tax
reputation does not realize how many firms eliminated the state without serious consideration of their communities as locations.205 Also,
within states, businessmen sometimes decide against locating in larger
cities, because large cities have higher per capita expenses than smaller
towns and suburbs.
Since Strasma's work, two studies of business land uses have generally concurred with his approach."0 ' One emphasized the importance
of tax images or reputations:
There is also evidence that once a State or a locality is identified
as a high tax location or a location in which firms are taxed unfairly,
it is difficult to erase the image. Once a state has been identified as
being a "high tax" State for industry, the "image" persists even
though that State subsequently changes its laws and administrative
practices. Tax managers ascribe this to the attitude of top executives
and boards of directors, who having once been exposed to what they
regard as unreasonable tax treatment, are reluctant to repeat the
mistake.' 7
What now needs to be understood is which taxes can help and which
can injure a location's tax reputation. Strasma concluded that businessmen prefer property taxes on real estate to property taxes on both real
estate and personal property (machinery and inventories), and that property taxes are preferred over income taxes.20 8 The Advisory Commission
in Intergovernmental Relations, surveying a number of tax preference
studies, found that sales taxation was preferred to income taxation because it was not considered a serious deterrent to retail trade and because it spread the costs of government more evenly. 2 9 It would seem,
then, that personal income taxation is the least acceptable form of taxation to businessmen. Assuming firms are interested in minimizing tax
costs, it would seem that firms will prefer the taxes which burden them
the least. Thus, a tax program should vary depending on what type of
business a community wants to attract or discourage. Firms with large
labor forces relative to capital investments, for example, should prefer
property taxation to payroll levies, while capital intensive firms would
prefer the opposite emphasis.
The existing studies have focused largely on interjurisdictional tax
cost differentials and ignored the income reducing effects of taxation on
205

Id. at 8.
See Due, supra note 200; ACIR 1967.
207 ACIR 1967 at 62.
208 STRASmA, supra note 131.
209 ACIR 1967 at 42-45.
206
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business land use. Such effects are probably minor, because important offsets to income reduction exist. One will be tax shifting. Mieszkowski's
review of business tax shifting indicates that tax shifting would appear
to be fairly complete."' ° A second offset is the availability of services
which tax revenues provide. If state or local taxes are used to provide
services which the firm would otherwise have to finance for itself, such
as waste disposal, or are used to provide services which the firm views
as useful or essential to attracting and maintaining a labor force, then
such taxes will be unlikely to alter land use decision making. Finally, the
deductability of many taxes from both state and federal income taxation
will act as an offset to income reduction.
The impact of taxation on commercial land uses other than industrial and manufacturing type businesses will vary with the type of business the land user conducts. The impact of taxes on one major nonindustrial business use, agriculture, has received tremendous attention in
recent years and is the subject of the next section.
E. The Special Case of Agricultural Land
Farmers have received special property tax treatment for some
time.
The justification offered was that farmers use less community
services per acre than do city dwellers. But today, when property taxes
are used for many purposes other than those directly benefiting property,
this argument is not as persuasive. Today agricultural interest groups
have joined with environmentalists to argue that high property taxes
will force the conversion of agricultural and open space to suburban uses.
In response, many states have adopted special tax assessment programs
in which agricultural and open space land is taxed on its value in its
present use rather than on its fair market value. Since 1956, when Maryland first adopted such a program, approximately thirty states have enacted similar legislation. 2 ' These programs are distinct in several material respects, raise different kinds of legal problems, and have met
with varying degrees of legal and practical success.
210

See Mieszkowski, supra note 115.

21 Early Indiana law permitted farms within city borders exceeding five acres to be

exempt from city general purpose tax levy. IND. LAWS chs. 15 & 58 (1867), held constitutional in Hamilton v. City of Fort Wayne, 40 Ind. 491 (1872). For other examples
see 111 A.L.R. 1486 (1937). For history of open space taxation see Hagman, Open Space
Planning and Property Taxation-Some Suggestions, 1964 Wis. L. REv. 628.
212See T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, STATE PROGRAMS FOR THnE DIFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT
OF FARM AND OPEN SPACE LAND (U.S. Dept. of Agric., Agric. Econ. Rept. 265, April 1974);
Henke, Preferential Property Tax Treatment for Farmland, 53 ORE. L. REV. 117, at 117
n.1 (1974).
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One major difference among the programs is the land uses to which
they apply. Some programs cover only agricultural uses. Others include
woodlands, open space, or recreational land uses as well.2" 3 Interestingly,
however, none of the programs attempt to distinguish between urban
fringe and remote rural locations. An owner is entitled to preferential
treatment whether or not the land is in the path of development or would
probably remain relatively open even without reduced property tax.
Another difference among the programs is their requirements of
the owner in exchange for a tax advantage. In some cases, owners who
have received tax relief may be penalized when their use changes to one
not within the scope of the program. The typical restrictive agreement2"
is most burdensome from the perspective of the landowner. Here, the
owner contracts with the relevant governmental unit for a term--often
ten years-to keep his land in a certain use. Should he be allowed to
cancel or should he choose to refuse to renew his agreement at term's
end, the landowner must pay deferred taxes based on the tax advantage
he has gained during the term of the agreement."' California, rather
than collecting deferred taxes, reduces the advantage over the remainder
of the restricted period after a contract is not renewed. 6 It would seem
that the longer the owner observes the contract, the greater the back tax
liability would be when he gets out of the program. Usually, however,
back taxes will be limited to no more than a seven to ten year period.""
Some states provide for a stiff 20-25 percent penalty for failure to notify
a government agency of change in use." 8
About 18 states have programs which fix the conditions (including
penalties) of the program by statute rather than individual agreements
with landowners. The back taxes that are collectible under these programs can be as much as ten years worth.""
213 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 12-107a to f (1975).
2 14

Approximately ten states use the restrictive agreement approach. Among them are
California, Florida, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington. All land in the
program is not necessarily covered by agreements. For instance, Florida has covenants for
recreation and parks, FLA. STAT. §193.501(1) (Supp. 1975) which do not apply to
agriculuture. See FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (Supp. 1975).
215
See WAsH. REv. CODE §84.34.030 (Supp. 1974); FLA. STAT. §193.501(4) Supp.
1975); HAwAii REv. STAT. § 246-10(f) (3) (Supp. 1974).
216 CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 426 (West Supp. 1975).
2 17
Washington and Florida are examples of seven and ten year limits respectively.

See note 215 supra.
218 Washington charges 20 percent. WAsr. REv.
219 OpE.

REV. STAT.

CODE

§ 84.34.080(2) (Supp. 1974).

§ 308.395 (1973). Other states with this type of deferred tax

program include Alaska, Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, and Virginia.

Montana, New
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Since an owner is not contractually bound, these programs do not
burden him with obtaining cancellation approval. Preferential assessment laws have no deferred tax or penalty and require only that land
use be restricted for each year of tax relief.2 ' The trend is away from
preferential assessment laws toward deferred tax and restrictive agreement programs. Because of the penalties these laws contain it is believed they will more effectively control the conversion of land from
agricultural or open space uses.
Programs also differ in how land becomes enrolled. They can be
compared by focusing on whether they are voluntary and on how eligibility is defined. Most programs are voluntary. In addition to awaiting the landowner's initiative, some statutes permit local officials to
solicit participants, allowing local governments a more active role in
implementing a program." ' California follows this latter course, but
also leaves to local government the initial decision whether landowners
in a jurisdiction can participate in the state program, and thus does not
uniformly encourage participation of all eligible lands.2 In order to
more firmly control land use, Oregon has established farm use zones
where eligible landowners are automatically enrolled. 2 ' The statutes
have other various ways of defining eligible land or landowners, all
keyed to the objectives of the particular program.2 4
For the land that programs do enroll, administrative differences
among programs produce varying burdens on government and landowners. Assessment of land in its restricted use may be figured on either
an actual or potential basis. The latter method is often thought to promote efficient agricultural production. Three specific evaluation methods
are employed: recent comparative market sales of similar land (when
available),22 certain statutorily prescribed factors applied to the re2 20

States with preferential assessment laws include Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware,
Indiana, Iowa, and Wyoming.
221 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51230 (West Supp. 1975).
122 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51240 (West Supp. 1975).
223
Oa. REV. STAT. § 308.370(1) (1971).
224 Some states are concerned with separating speculators from agricultural producers.
Kentucky requires a showing that the land has been used for agricultural purposes plus
current production by the landowner. Ky. REv. STAT. § 132.450(2) (a), (b) (1971). In urban
fringe areas, the speculator label would seem to attach to all, making separation difficult.
For use assessment problems in agriculture see Ganley, Assessing Farm Land Under
Maryland's "Use Value Assessment Law," 33 AssEssoRs NEWSLETTER 4 (Jan. 1967).
Regarding open space uses, some states focus on the land in its natural state, or as
developed for recreational use. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 193.501(6) (a), (b) (Supp. 1975).
225 Oregon gives this method priority with provision for income capitalization in the
alternative. ORE. REv. STAT. § 308.345(3) (1973).
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stricted use,2 2 6 and some form of income capitalization. Within this last
category, the multiples may be legislatively determined or may be calculated from a number of alternative approaches to capitalization.2 27
This latter method of capitalization of income often includes variables
sensitive to current circumstances and so may be the most accurate.
But it is the most burdensome because of the effort involved in ascertaining the essential data, some of which cannot be verified.2 28 Whether
landowners consider the method of calculating the tax as an incentive
or disincentive to participation will depend on whether they prefer more
stable tax cost or the flexibility of a variable expense, and may well turn
on their perception of the accuracy of calculation.
Another administrative problem is the dual use and market value
assessment required whenever a program has a deferred tax element.
Because the deferred tax is calculated on the differential of these values
for the most recent years,229 the government must make two assessments
each year. Assuming the difference increases, the tax liability continues
to increase despite the limited number of years' penalty that can be collected. Thus, the landowner may be encouraged to sell early. Connecticut penalizes the owner a percentage of market value, and the percentage diminishes to zero after ten years of participation.2 " This offers
an incentive to keep the land in the restricted use.
Potentially significant side effects may occur depending on the particular structure of a program. If there is no tax penalty on participating landowners, a portion of the county tax burden will be shifted to
226

Florida has refined a statutory list, currently comprised of the following use factors:
(1) quantity and size of property; (2) condition of property; (3) present market value as
agricultural land; (4) income produced; (5) productivity of land in its present use;
(6) economic merchantability of the agricultural produce; and (7) other agricultural factors.
FA. STAT. § 193.481 (Supp. 1975). See Wershow, Ad Valorem Assessment in Florida-The
Demand
for a Viable Solution, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 49 (1972).
227

Capitalization is a fixed rate in Colorado, set at 11-Y2 percent. COLO. REv.

STAT.

§ 39-1-103(5) (1973). The multiplier may be based on production or a fair rental value.
When such data is unobtainable, California uses a multi-component method: a safe component (percent equaling long term government lands), a risk component (based on location
and type of crop), an amortization for perennials (crops), and a property tax component
(percent of total market value). CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §423(a)(1), (2); §423(b)

(Supp. 1975). There may be a significant tax effect resulting from small changes in capitalization rates. See Note, Property Taxation of Agricultural and Open Space Land, 8 HAuv.
1. Lw. 158, 184 (1970).
228 In testimony before the Assembly Select Committee on Open Space Lands (March
23, 1973), R.B. Welch, Asst. Exec. Sec'ty of the California State Board of Equalization,
the difficulty of determining the risk component.
emphasized
229
To calculate, add up the actual differences between the years subject to recapture,
or take the most recent year's differential and multiply by the appropriate number of years.
23
oCoxN. GEN. STAT. § 12-504a (Supp. 1975). This system looks more like preferential
assessment laws as the tenth year is approached.
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non-program lands as local governments seek to replace lost revenues.2
Tax deferral allows the recovery of part of the lost revenues, although
the time lag is still a problem for financially strapped governments.232
State support of these programs can cut down on the financial burden
these programs impose. Only a few states have adopted this practice,
and the amounts committed to such programs are limited.233 At some
point the magnitude of the tax shift will probably cause non-program
landowners to develop their lands prematurely in order to fight increasing taxes. Under this influence, both current and prospective program
participants would tend to re-examine the efficacy of receiving the tax
advantage. Thus, where tax rate increases are greatest, the potential
for this injurious effect may be anticipated and would conflict with governmental plans for orderly growth.
Although most of the differential assessment laws are of recent
origin, a number of studies have analyzed the functioning of these programs. They focus on agricultural uses. Some of the questions considered have been what land programs have enrolled, how incentive
levels and program procedures affect participation, whether programs
have slowed conversion of urban fringe land to suburban use, and what
the magnitude and effect of the tax burden shift to non-program lands
has been. Generally, these studies do not recommend abandoning the
programs, but suggest ways to improve them and enumerate areas in
need of further study.
Several studies have examined what land particular programs have
affected. A survey of farm, timber, and other open space land participants in Washington's program showed that a high percentage of owners in that program intended to continue their current land use for at
least 15 years, and disclosed a low percentage of those who would have
to change use if denied the tax advantage.234 Thus, in Washington, it
appears the tax break among participating owners was not a significant
factor in controlling land use.
231

R. FELLMETH, POLITICS OF LAND:

RALPH NADER'S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON LAND

USE IN CALIFORNIA 42 (1973).
232 When landowners begin to leave the program, the cost of their decision, which
is the deferred tax, helps reduce revenue loss to local government. Id.
233 See Maine for forests, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 563 (1965), New York for
agriculture, N.Y. AcRic. & MxTs. LAW § 305 (McKinney Supp. 1974), and California for
all restricted uses, CAL. Gov'T CODE: §§ 16140-43 (West Supp. 1975). For an analysis of
the related property tax equalization issue raised by the school finance decision which
may cause these programs to institute reparation schemes see Hagman, Property Tax Reform: Speculations on the Impact of the Serrano Equalization Principle, 1 REAL ESTAT L.
REv. 115 (1972).
234 Barren, Impacts on Open Space Taxation in Washington, WASm AOR. EXPT. STA.
BuLLETI 772 (March 1973).
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However, since the property tax burden nationally is greater on
farm than on non-farm income,"' it would seem property tax relief
would be important to land use decisions in many areas. In California,
where property taxes on net personal farm income rose to 22.2 percent
in 1970,23 tax relief would seem to be called for. However, after seven
years of existence, California's program covered 11.4 million acres--or
only 22 percent of all private lands, and 82 percent of the farmland, in
the state.23 7 A thorough analysis of the program indicated that land
quality was not significantly related to the process influencing enrollment, finding prime agricultural land in equal proportion to other farmland in and out of the program.23 8 Thus, a tremendous amount of lesser
quality land is being benefited by the program and, to some extent, the
program is merely providing low holding costs to wealthy owners and
long term speculators. 39 A Ralph Nader group report draws this conclusion, finding that just ten large landowners enrolled one-fifth of all
program land.2"' Taking its own survey of Santa Clara county restrictive use contracts, the group discovered many enrollments of land remote from cities, while farmers living on urban fringe land were having
applications rejected because their lands were too likely to be developed.2" 1 The study concluded that "the beneficiaries of the land are not
the small, independent, dedicated farmer

ponents envisioned.

. . .

that the Act and its pro-

2 42

A number of studies have looked at program incentives and procedures to determine what effect they may have on participation levels.
One theoretical analysis concluded that a landowner in Santa Clara
County, California, could cancel his ten year contract after six years
without suffering loss, 24 3 although changes from the assumed land infla-

tion rates, capital return rates, and cycles of market value reassessments
Gustafson, supra note 129, at 41.
This figure was up from 6.6 percent in 1955.
237 Id. at 50-54.
235

23

6 Id.

23 8

Id. at 64. There apparently was, however, a marked increase in enrollment of prime
agricultural land following the 1969 amendments which made the enrollment contracts
less restrictive. Wagenseil & Harris, supra note 224, at 189-90.
239The California program has been criticized because "it does not provide for permanent open space, but simply lowers holding costs for the long term speculators." 1 AssoCIATiON

24 0

o

BAY AREA GovERNiNTS,

How

TO I.TIEMENT OPEN SrACE

PLANs 53 (1973).

Fellmeth, supra note 31, at 4. Although critical of many aspects of the report,
Professor Ellickson does agree that the California program is a complicated system of tax
evasion for the state's large landowners. Ellickson, Book Review, 47 So. CAIsF. L. REv.
641, 650 (1974).
241 Felimeth, supra note 231, at 42.
242
243

Id. at 41.
Mix, Restricted Use Assessment in California: Can it Fulfill its Objectives?, 11

SANTA CLARA LAw. 259, 264-67 (1971).
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could severely limit the accuracy of the analysis."'4 A study done in
Maryland, however, emphasized the importance of a tax penalty limit
in obtaining tax relief.2"' According to a study done of the operation
of the California act around Sacramento, though, the initial decision to
participate hinges not on overall tax incentive but on whether the landowner perceives early development." 6 This report found the perception
that early development would occur to be higher among corporate and
individual owners who did not live on their land.2" 7 It was not determined if this phenomenon was attributable to land passing from local
to remote ownership as the development horizon approached. The differing perceptions about development for similarly located lands at least
leaves open the question whether all owners consider development the
primary focus for decision.
A study of Florida's use value assessment procedure found that the
requirements and interests of local assessors produce non-uniform valuations. Thus the program will not have the same effect statewide.4 " The
high cost of appealing assessor decisions blocks the achievement of uniform assessments that would make the program most effective. 4 9 It
was suggested that the program might be improved if regional boards
evaluated similar type lands across several counties, in a practice modelled after the English procedure.250 This assumes landowners will not
enter the program unless they receive comparable tax relief to similarly
situated landowners throughout the state. Gustafson believes that the
uneven effect of California's plan results from permitting local governments to decide whether to implement the state program within its jurisdiction.25 ' Thus, the procedures chosen may affect participation by
altering the state level of tax incentive or directly limiting potential enrollment when the program is at the discretion of local government.
244 Id. at 266. Noting the increase in enrollment in 1970-71 which was contrary to
the assertion that the program was excessively restrictive and punitive, Mix offers the
following explanation from an affected rancher: "We don't like a lot of things about the
Williamson Act, but right now we have no choice . . . we're boxed in. It's this or go
broke." Id at 278.
245 House, Partial Tax Exemption for Farmland Properties in the Rural-Urban Fringe,
THE 2 APPRAisAL
JoURNAL, July 1968, at 405-06.
46
LAND USE RESEARCH

GROUP, UNIVERsITY OF CALIFORNIA AT DAVIS, REPORT TO THE

ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITTEE ON OPEN SPACE LANDS, THE CALIFORNIA LAND CONSERVATION
ACT IN SACRAMENTO COUNTY: IMPLEMENTATION AND EPEECTIVENIESS 2 (Oct. 1972).
247 Id. at 30-32.

248 See Wershow, supra note 226.
249 Id. at 67; Wershow, Regional Valuation Boards-A British Answer to Ad Valorem
Assessment Problems in Florida, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 324-25 (1969).
250 See Wershow, supra note 226, at 57; Wershow, supra note 249, at 326-32.
25 Gustafson, supra note 129, at 40-54, 92-93. Gustafson describes the spatial distri-

bution of land in the program and indicates that part of the problem of uniform application is the lack of commitment to orderly growth by local government.
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The studies have indicated that programs have not been very successful in slowing conversion of land to suburban use. Gustafson shows
that the greater the distance from population centers, the higher the
participation in the California program.25 2 A study of the earliest of
these programs in Maryland confirms this experience.25
Data concerning use assessment in Maryland in 1967 demonstrated
that assessed valuation per acre still varied with distance from cities
rather than land use. "54 Gustafson's study suggests that development
opportunities created by forces of urban dispersal can outweigh the
full
255
tax break offered when landowners evaluate alternative decisions.
If tax relief alone is not going to slow conversion of land at the
fringe of development, perhaps these programs should be abandoned
completely, or severely restricted to apply only to land which should be
temporarily withheld from development. 5 Whether tax policy can be
successfully combined with more vigorous zoning in the agricultural/
open space area has not been evaluated. 27" Nor has the concept of state
reparations to local government been analyzed to assess its ability to
encourage enrollment of prime agricultural land located in the urban
fringe. 58
252 Gustafson, supra note 129, at 65-67.
253 See House, supra note 245, at 395-96.
25 4
Id. at 396.
255 Gustafson, supra note 129, at 22-26, 43, 89.
256 One writer made this point over a decade ago. Stocker, Taxing Farmland in the
Urban Fringe, Tax Policy HI, No. 12, 7-8 (Dec. 1963). Stocker also indicated the state
should buy an interest in land it wanted to keep permanently open. House, supra note 242,
at 403-04, discusses this alternative based on existing revenue sources. No study explores
the effect of a government buying land it desires to keep in agriculutral uses. An earlier
article by Stocker admitted that "where a community has formulated a clear plan for
regional development . . . there is a positive and constructive role for some form of tax
abatement on land designated for agriculture.... Without such a plan.., we should not
expect tax deferral in itself to accomplish much toward preserving open spaces or agriculture production." Stocker, How Should We Tax Farmland in the Rural-Urban Fringe?, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE Fim-FoutmR
ANxuAl CONFERFNCE ON TAXATIoN 463, 470 (1961).
25 Oregon's utilization of farm use zones has been at the discretion of local governments and in accordance with their general land use plans, generally in remote rural areas.
ORE. REv. STAT. § 215.203(1) (1973). An interesting provision allows for other compatible
uses in these farm zones including residential areas for farm workers, provided they are
on the lesser quality lands in the area. ORE.REv. STAT. § 215.213(3) (b), (c), (d) (1973). This
may help direct urban growth around unique and valuable farmland. A thorough legislative
report discussing the connection of zoning with tax benefits concluded that "[bly compensating the landowner . . . the Legislature may authorize the imposition of restrictions
which are more rigorous than those allowed under conventional zoning." CAL. LEGIs. JT.
ComLa. ON OPEN SPACE LAaN, FnAl REPORT 114 (Feb. 1970). Supporting more mandatory
participation, is the notion that individual planning has left land idle awaiting capital gains
and caused premature development. Stocker, How Should We Tax Farmland in the RuralUrban Fringe?, in PROCEEDINCS OF THE Fn r-FouRT Ai
LNUI
CONERE=NCE ON TAXATION
463, 2467
(1961).
8
' The statute provides for reparations
(called subventions) scaled in amount to
particular lands and location: $3.00 per acre per year for prime agricultural land located
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Both theoretical and empirical studies haxe examined the tax shift
to local government and non-participating landowners. A comprehensive survey of New Hampshire's program identified the three most significant variables: the total valuation of qualified property, the participation level among those eligible, and the percentage of tax relief.259
This evaluation found that non-participants in small urban-fringe districts would pay a disproportionately larger tax (8.3 percent)."' For
states with wide variation in the size of districts having urban-fringe
characteristics, the study suggests a regional or statewide tax base would
be more equitable.
The additional tax burden on local governments who must replace
revenue lost under a tax relief program is substantiated by Carman and
Polson. 1 Gustafson suggests non-participants in the limited area of
urban fringe are induced to early development as the increases in participation will increase their burden. " While it would be difficult to
prove that the tax burden alone forces development, it is certainly an
influence." 3 Tax deferral, after a lag when the program begins, can
minimize the bad effect of the shift. It may be possible to discover the
balance between the government's need to generate revenue and the incentive needed to get owners into these programs. Limiting back tax
liability to a fixed percentage may be a reasonable way to arrive at a
certain and satisfactory figure." The fixed percent of market value is
flexible in stable and deflationary markets and maintains alienability of
land during unfavorable economic conditions.
There has been more intensive study in the last decade of the influence of these differential assessment programs as a means of controlling certain land uses than of any other aspect of the taxes and land
within three miles of incorporated areas greater than 1,500 population or within one mile or
less of smaller areas, $1.50 for other prime agricultural land and $.50 for all other qualifying
open space land. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16142 (West Supp. 1975).
259 Ching & Frick, Effect of Use Value Assessment on Property Tax Rates, 52 Am. J.
oF AoR.
ECON. 603 (1970).
6

1 1 Id. at 604-05. The study included 231 towns in New Hampshire divided into eight
groups according to population size. The model varied in participation from 10--90 percent
of qualified lands and ranged from 30-75 percent in tax abatement. The study tested the
model for an ongoing program, running a time period which showed the effect of government recovery of deferred taxes as some participants left the program. They found an
overall 1.5 percent increase in the tax rate for government to replace revenues in an ongoing
program through 1985.
261 Carman & Polson, Tax Shifts Occurring as a Result of Differential Assessment of
Farmland: California 1968-69, 24 NATrL TAx J. 449 (1971).
262 Gustafson, supra note 129, at 89. See also Note, supra note 227.
263 House, supra note 245, at 400-02, indicates the tax shift is 10-12 percent for urban
fringe counties and only 4-5 percent for more remote counties.
264

Id. at 405-07.
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use planning relationship. On the whole, commentators have not found
these programs to be very successful. With all of the attempts to determine why they have failed, the easy answers are probably closest to
the truth. Owners of land ripe for development are hesitant to pass up
a chance to make a tremendous profit by restricting their land to farm
or open space use. Owners remote from the immediate path of urban
expansion have much to gain and little to lose from enrolling in these
programs, and so they do at a greater rate than those whom the scheme
was designed to protect in the first place. Whether changes in these
tax relief mechanisms can be made that will accomplish the objectives
of preserving land in agricultural and open space uses remains to be seen.

IV. CREATING A POSITIVE ROLE FOR
TAXATION IN rHE LAND USE PLANNING PROCESS
A. The Need for Contet-Some Growth and Land Use Goals Identified
Gaining some insight into how certain taxes may influence the
value, use, or consumption of land is only a first step in using taxes to
cope with the problems of growth. Determining when taxes should replace, or might be reformed to better complement, regulations requires
identifying land use objectives and formulating a program that utilizes
all the tools at government's disposal to achieve them.
The existence of competing interests, many of them involving
fundamental rights and principles, makes drawing up a comprehensive
set of land use objectives a most difficult task. In practice a community's list of goals is often stimulated by fiscal and environmental problems brought about by rapid growth. In these situations the thrust of
the planning effort is to dodge rather than cope with growth and land
use problems. Such programs are obviously not long range solutions
to the land use problems we face. However, some common objectives
can be discerned from several recent sources which would seem to be
desirable parts of a responsible set of land use objectives.
A high pr-iority in recent plans and local reports is the preservation
of unique and irreplaceable environmental resources. This reflects the
rapid and substantial manner in which the nation's environmental consciousness has been raised in the last few years. A prime example of
this is Colorado, where a grass-roots campaign resulted in the rejection
of the 1976 Winter Olympics by Colorado's citizens in a November
265
1972 vote.
265 One of the leaders of this movement, Richard Lamm, was subsequently elected
Governor of Colorado. His campaign emphasized environmental issues.
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It is not surprising that environmental protection is a high priority
item in Colorado, for it has an abundance of these resources to safeguard. The debate over how to preserve these resources has been a sharp
one.266 The state's geography and the patterns of settlement are at the
root of the problem. The Front Range has been the center of the economic and population boom in Colorado. This area is a narrow strip
along the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains26 in which approximately three-fourths of all Coloradeans live. Residents of the Front
Range have generally been the most vocal opponents of continued, unchecked growth. This is perhaps in response to the crowding and environmental deterioration of the area itself. Those who have settled outside the heavily populated Front Range are not anxious to tear up the
countryside. However, farmers, ranchers, other landowners, and smalltown businessmen are anxious to participate in some of the economic
benefits the more urbanized part of the state has reaped with the arrival
of new industry and new people. They do not want to close Colorado's
doors if it means giving up this potential prosperity. Therein lies the
conflict. The votes for Governor Lamm and against the Olympics illustrate the political climate, but recreational and other development has
not stopped. The state legislature has recognized the need to confront
the problems of growth on a statewide basis. It set up a commission
and charged it with the responsibility of developing a land use program
for the state. The report that resulted recognized the importance of environmental resource preservation:
Colorado faces three major land-use challenges in the environmental
field:
-To control development so that it respects land capacity and preserves environmental amenities, including air and water quality.
-To preserve environmentally fragile areas, areas of scenic beauty,
and significant natural, historic, and cultural resources.
-To provide adequate and accessible recreational opportunities for
its citizens. 6 '
There may be some cause for concern that opportunity for disadvantaged persons is jeopardized by the rise of environmentalism. The
protection of natural resources can be inconsistent with the expansion
of job and housing opportunities for the poor. Also, environmental
266 See generally CITIZENS GUiDE, at 42-46; Cameron, Growth is a Fighting Word in
Colorado's Mountain Wonderland, FORTUNE, Oct. 1973, at 148.
267 The Front Range extends roughly from Pueblo north through Colorado Springs,
Denver, Boulder, and on to Fort Collins.
268
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concerns sometimes mask what are really exclusionary attitudes. Despite these worries we have a common interest in preserving our environmental resources-for both economic and recreational reasons. Methods must be devised of accommodating the need for environmental protection with housing and economic opportunities for the poor. Concepts
such as planned unit developments, new towns, and inclusionary ordinances2 69 are some of the ways cities and states can accommodate population increases and protect economic and housing opportunities without permitting environmental deterioration to continue.
Related to environmental preservation is the effort to insure that
sufficient open space and green belt areas are provided within urban
centers. Such areas guarantee that all residents will have recreational
opportunities, and supply some visual relief to the cement and grayness
of cities. Areas around schools, flood plains, and areas difficult to develop (such as mountain slopes) can be used for open space and green
belt purposes. The devotion of land to this use can provide boundaries
within a metropolitan area and a sense of relief from crowding and
congestion.
Another growth goal that many governments share is the redevelopment and revitalization of already urbanized areas and the working
toward a rational pattern of metropolitan expansion. One reason for
the concern in this area is the conversion (at least prematurely) of prime
agricultural land on the rural-urban fringe to suburban uses. Another
justification is the economic waste that occurs in- deteriorating sections
of metropolitan areas and increased community costs caused by sprawl
and leap-frog patterns of development. If people are to be housed adequately, and land at the urban fringe is to be preserved, there must be
more in-filling of already developed areas.
San Diego is an example of a city that recognizes that its future
is dependent on the ability to continually renew its urbanized area and
control its urban expansion. San Diego's population has more than
tripled since 1940, and it is now among the fifteen largest cities in the
nation 7 Disenchantment with the way the city was developing led
to the election of Pete Wilson, a young state legislator, as mayor. Wilson
ran on a platform calling for government, not developers, to control
when and where development would occur. A majority of the city coun269
Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances-Policy and Legal Issues in Requiring Private
Developers to Build Low Cost Housing, 21 U.C.L.AL. REv. 1432 (1974).
27 0
For background on San Diego, see CiT=ZENs Gum at 48-49; Harris, Californians
Are Saying 'No' to Growth in a Spreading Revolt That Makes Strange Allies, CaromA
JouRNAL, July 1973, at 225-26.
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cil elected at the same time was sympathetic to this stand. An early
confrontation between the new San Diego government and developers
took place over Mira Mesa, a leap-frogged area of development where
tract houses were proliferating without adequate schools, sewers, or
other necessary elements of infra-structure. The developers capitulated
there, agreeing, in the face of a threatened building permit moratorium,
to fund schools, sewers, and other improvements. San Diego's policies
have since been formalized:
It shall be the policy . .. to permit phased growth in undeveloped

areas and more intensive development and redevelopment of areas previously urbanized only after a total cost/revenue analysis. The City
Council shall establish growth priorities among the various areas now
largely undeveloped.
It shall be the policy . . . to assist the private sector in more

intensive development and redevelopment of areas previously unbanized after a total cost/revenue analysis.27 '
This policy recognizes the need to regulate new development and redevelopment of areas to bring them into closer correspondence with San
Diego's capability to provide services needed to sustain such development and to the rationalization of growth with the area's environmental
objectives.
Finally, enlightened land use goals must be responsive to social
problems. Three related principles are involved:
(a) Maximization of individual mobility, choice of town size and living accommodation;
(b) Acceptance of all natural growth by an area, subject to environmental limitations; and
(c) Provision to all citizens, regardless of land use impacts, of certain minimum services and the equitable spreading of the financial
costs of providing such services.
These concepts have not been endorsed wholeheartedly by many
local governments. The no-growth movement is evidence that this is
the case. However, some governments have recognized their responsibility to deal with rather than to avoid the social problems that this
country faces. An excellent example is the Colorado Land Use Commission's Report which was briefly mentioned earlier.2 72 It identifies
three important land use related social concerns: access for all residents
to decent housing and adequate community services reasonably close to
job centers, preservation of the state's diverse styles of living and his272 City of San Diego, Council Policy No. 600-18 (adopted July 6, 1972).
272 See REPORT, note 268, supra.
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torical inheritance, and equitable distribution of financial burdens incurred in carrying out land use programs.2 73 Care must be taken so
that environmental objectives do not unnecessarily justify exclusive preserves for the wealthy. The Colorado Land Use Commission urges the
formulation of a socially responsive land use program which will be
based on facts rather than supposition about the impacts of growth, and
which will move toward a policy of broad and reasonable accommodation of growth.27 Recognition of responsibility to all segments of the
population must be an essential component of any set of land use goals.
State governments several decades ago abandoned much of their
authority over land use planning to local governments because the locals
were in a better position to decide how their health, safety, and general
welfare could be maximized. But local governments have become more
provincial and self-centered in the exercise of their delegated powers
while the basis for the delegation has been disappearing. If it was true
that one community's actions did not impact on nearby communities,
such is the case no longer. Some governments, both state and local, are
recognizing that their own interests, as well as the nation's, are best
served by accepting the fact that they can never be insulated from the
problems growth creates. The solution of our land use crisis depends
on the general acceptance of this notion and on the formulation of a
set of land use and growth objectives with which we can all live.
Id. at 131-43.
The Report sets forth the need for particular measures to promote the fair spread
of indirect costs for land use programs across the population:
Care should be taken that the net effect of State fiscal policy in respect to land
use is to narrow rather than widen the income differentials among population
groups. The incidence of any special assessments or other land-use-related taxes
should generally be progressive. Any proposed use of development incentives such
as tax exemptions or deferments should be scrutinized for its net effect on the
public treasury and the overall incidence of tax burdens (direct loss in tax collections vs. long-term impacts on revenues through increased property values,
income multiplier effects, etc.).
User charges, even though they are generally regressive, have a place in land-use
and environmental programs. However, care should be taken that the structure
of user fees does not have the effect of altogether excluding lower-income groups
(the elderly, the unemployed) from the service or facility involved. State financial
planning and institutional change, as related to implementation of state land-use
policies, over time should contribute to reducing the fiscal disparities among communities within the same region and SMSA. These disparities are reflected in
the variations in the tax rates, property tax assessment practices, and per capita
expenditures for public services often existing among neighboring cities and towns.
This contrast is most striking between affluent, low-density suburban communities
and inner cities which often have greater welfare burdens, unemployment and
other social ills. Such problems are essentially a consequence of imperfections in
the overall regional economy (i.e. labor and housing market); means should
be explored for distributing the resulting burden more equitably on a statewide,
regional, or metropolitan basis.
Id. at 133-34.
273
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B. Using Taxes as a Land Use Planning Tool
If a government has settled on a set of land use objectives, it must
then develop the best program to achieve them. Police power regulations along with other devices in the control of local governments will
play a major part in any such program. The question here is what can
and should be the role of the tax power. It has been demonstrated that
taxes do influence the value of land, the consumption of land, and when
and how land will be developed. Given this, at a minimum local governments should undertake to eliminate the land use effects of their
taxes which cut against their land use planning objectives. More positively, communities might want to consider tax reforms that would be
designed to make tax policy an integral part of land use policy. This
would require some restructuring of local governments in order to
have planners, assessors, and budget-makers working together more
than is the current practice. Relying on taxation as a land use planning
technique will also require much additional study more specififically
aimed at the broad land use impacts of a tax than have been past studies.
Assessing the role which the major taxes considered in this article
could play in planning based on the current state of research is a speculative affair. However, a simple example using some of the land use
objectives previously discussed shows that further work in this area is
likely to be a worthwhile endeavor. Taking the most extreme case,
compare the land use consequences in a jurisdiction assuming it chose
to raise all of its revenue by means of only one of the taxes this article
has discussed. What would be the likely land use differences in a jurisdiction that raised its money solely by a sales tax rather than solely by
the property tax? Assume that the same amount of revenue is raised
under both taxes and that it is spent in the same manner. It is reasonable to infer from the studies done that environmental goals are more
likely to be achieved, and that there will be less inducement to sprawl
and blight, under a sales tax than under a property tax.
Land values should be higher under the sales tax. Oates 275 and
Sabella.. 6 have demonstrated the existence of tax and benefit capitalization. Since the same benefits will be provided under either tax, the
capitalization of those benefits should be the same under either tax.
Tax capitalization, however, should not be the same under the two
taxes. Oates and Sabella focused on the capitalization of the property
tax into land values, and found that land value was reduced by an
275
276

See Oates, note 103 supra.
See Sabella, note 105 supra.
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amount roughly equal to the property tax burden associated with the
land. No one has studied whether a sales tax would be so completely
capitalized into land value. In fact, there is good reason to believe that
such capitalization would not be present. It is true that the sales tax
reduces income just like the property tax, forcing taxpayers to reduce
expenditures in some manner. However, the sales tax is not tied directly
to the land, and taxpayers have a number of expenditures they may
trim to pay the tax. If taxpayers reduced only their housing and other
land related expenses, the sales tax would be capitalized like the property tax, but this seems unlikely to occur. More probably taxpayers will
cut a little spending from a number of areas to pay the tax. A very high
sales tax, therefore, might be capitalized to some extent into land values,
but the amount should be small, certainly less than the capitalization of
the property tax.
Thus, since the benefits, which increase land value, will be capitalized similarly under either tax, but the tax, which reduces land value,
will be more fully capitalized under a property tax system, it is reasonable to suggest that higher land values will exist in a jurisdiction which
employs a sales tax rather than a property tax. Increased land values
may mean less land consumed per person, which would seem to aid local
governments seeking to preserve environmental resources and maintain
open space.
George Peterson's recent property tax study. is also of significance
in determining the differences in a jurisdiction under a sales or a property tax. Peterson found that assessment inequalities do exist in the
administration of the property tax. These inequalities are the underassessment of land in stable and upwardly transitional areas and the
overassessment of land in declining areas. Because taxpayers can get
more house and land and less tax in stable or upwardly transitional
areas, they are induced to move there. Further, those who remain in
declining areas are actually penalized by paying more tax than they
would pay in an equitable property tax. Many times these areas are
newer and further away from the central city than declining areas.
The sales tax, to the contrary, requires no assessment and is neutral
with respect to location. One could expect, therefore, that the incentive
to move out to newer areas would be lessened by the removal of the
assessment break Peterson observed. Further, owners of property in
declining areas will not be impeded by overly large tax bills from maintaining or rehabilitating their property. If these effects come about be2 77

See PRopERTY TAxEs, HousING.
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cause a sales tax rather than a property tax is relied upon, there should
be less incentive to sprawl, with its attendant destructive effects on environmentally valuable land and open space, and less chance that blight
will occur.
If a jurisdiction elected to raise its revenue by means of an income
tax, one would expect many of the same results as under a sales tax.
Benefit capitalization, assuming similar expenditures, should be the same
regardless of the tax used to raise the revenue. As was the case with
the sales tax, however, tax capitalization is unlikely to be significant
for the income tax. Thus, the same land use benefits which might flow
from adopting a sales tax instead of a property tax should come from
an income tax.
Because an income tax is levied at the point income is earned
rather than spent, however, some land use consequences may result from
deciding to choose an income tax rather than a sales tax. For example,
saving is one way a taxpayer can avoid or reduce his taxes if a sales
tax is in force, an option unavailable under an income tax scheme. To
the extent taxpayers increase savings, more investment money will be
available. Increased supply of capital may stimulate development through
lower interest rates or activities of lenders who are anxious to make use
of all their funds. Two possible land use effects may derive from increased savings. On the one hand, the investment capital could be used
to renew and revitalize developed areas. It could also stimulate the
construction of apartments and other housing for moderate and lowincome people. Surplus capital, on the minus side, however, may find
its way into housing on the fringes of the city which may be inconsistent
with environmental and open space objectives.
Admittedly the preceding discussion is superficial, but it illustrates
the possibility that tax changes might influence land use decisions. Planners, economists, lawyers, budget-makers, and others who are involved
in what have generally been perceived to be different and distinct aspects
of government must begin to explore how the taxing and planning activities can be rationalized and harmonized. It should be apparent that
the failure to do this may negate considerably the effectiveness of any
land use plans, and perpetuate the financial squeeze and land use crisis
about which many communities are complaining.

